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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Future of the Aviation System 
I tJ~_nothi~g_i_~ not pres~mptuous to look ahead twenty years in any 
phase of human activity. This seems particularly true in civil aviation 
where the certificated airl ines are in the throes of transition from 
economic regulation to a free market system. Furthermore, while in the 
past forecasters could count on the number of players in the game remaining 
constant (subject to elimination by merger), currently new airlines are born 
every day, at least on paper. The friendly old aviation gang has broken 
up, with the rules of the game constantly changing. Thus at first glance 
an attempt now to predict what will happen in the future appears whimsical, 
if not downright foolish. 
However, this inquiry concerns not just the airlines, but aviation. 
Here that much-misused and maligned word, system', is justified. Airlines 
depend on many other parts: manufacturers build their aircraft, airports 
provide space to land them, and the air traffic control system keeps them 
apart. Then there is general aviation, by some measures the largest part 
of the system. The flying farmer in Kansas views the big jets which occasionally 
appear high overhead as simply faster and more expensive Greyhounds; looking 
at clear and empty skies over his homestead, talk about the aviation system 
straining at capacity appears ludicrous. 
One possible approach to the future is to dissect the system 
and look at the components. The objection to this tack is the interrelationship 
of the parts 
other parts. 
if one part moves, then it affects most, if not all, of the 
The problem is equivalent to solving a set of simultaneous 
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equations {with possibly time-varying coefficients}. For example~ if some. 
airports reach saturation, the effects on the system will appear in both the 
short term and the long term. In the short term, traffic may shift to other 
(nearby) airports; general aviation aircraft may be banned; larger aircraft 
may replace smaller ai rcraft, keeping op~ratI()~s alJrOst constant while 
providing extra lift; or operations may simply remain at the saturation 
1 eve 1 • In the long term, more or longer runways may be added to the 
airports; larger and more sophisticated ai·rcraft may be designed by the 
manufacturers; technological improvements in the ATC system may provide more 
airport and airway capacity. 
Furthermore, the outside world is interacting with the system and 
affecting its behavior. A slump in the economy leads to a downturn in 
travel, as fewer businessmen fly as well as fewer vacationers -- even the 
deepest discounts cannot attract the public when consumer confidence is 
down. And in the long run, changes in lifestyles, population make-up, 
telecommunications, etc., alter travel patterns as well. 
Since the aviation system has reacted to internal and external 
forces over time, a plaUSible approach to the future is to look back and 
search for potential cause-effect relationships. Then, if long term 
trends exist inside and outside the system. and links between them are 
identif~ed, pictures of the future can be drawn. These certainly will 
not be predictions, but rather possible evolutions of the syste~. 
Many alternative futures are poss ible, depending on the action taken· by 
different persons both inside and outside the aviation system. With some luck 
the futures that will be presented here will seem credible, even if not highly 
probable, given the nature of the task. At the least, they are intended to 
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stimulate thought about the likelihood of the putcomes they portray. 
Consequently, to planners concerned with aviation, they may provide 
guidelines for possible initiatives in research and technology~ 
* The author would like to acknowledge the guidance and assistance of the 
contract monitors, Messrs Robert ,Letchworth and Matt Winston of NASA Langley 
Research Center. 
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1.2 The Aviation System: Definitions and Measures 
The aviation system is sufficiently complex so that no single 
statistic can provide a comprehensive overview. However, there are 
measures of activity which indicate how fast the system is changing and some 
key variables which explain how the system functions. There are also 
constraints (or potential constraints) on the system (or various subsystems), 
and linkages between constraints and key variables. These constraints 
mayor may not be quantifiable, such as regulatory changes, aircraft noise 
limitations, and airport curfews. 
It is possible to classify the subsystems of aviation in many ways 
the exact designation is not important if no major components are lost. 
Most simply, the system can be split into the users of the system and the 
providers of the service. The users are general aviation and public-for-hire 
carriers (scheduled and unscheduled, a distinction which is gradually being 
blurred). The suppliers of the service are airports, airways, the ATC 
system, and the aerospace industry which builds- the vehicles which flow over 
the sys tem. More deta iIi s provi ded in Fi gure L 1. 
Different classifications are possible. One used often 
(~chriever and Seifert, 1967) splits the system into air vehicle; air traf-
fic control; and airports and terminals. Another widely used breakdown 
(FAA, 1967) is into air carriers, GA, fuel consumption, aircraft technology, 
air cargo, aviation safety and complementary and competing modes. Yet 
another way (CARD, 1971) is to look at the system from a mission point of 
view (commercial passenger service, air cargo, GA) and a system element 
point of view {air vehicles, ATC, airports, complementary surface transporta-
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ti on) . It is apparent that classifications and their concomitant emphases 
depend to a large degree on who is looking at the system and for what reason. 
Figure 1.1 shows the complete system. Some parts of it wi 11 receive 
little analysis in this study: military components (since the emphasis is 
on civil aviation) and non-transportation-related GA activity. Table 1. 1 
shows the key measures of activity which will be used throughout the study. 
1. Pub 1 i c 
Service .-------1 
Figure 1. 1 
The Aviation System 
A. User Subsystems 
____ ~[TrUnkS, Regionals, etc (jet equipment) 
Commuters (propeller equipment) 
-[
Scheduled 
Passenger 
Supplemental (large aircraft) 
Charters -----I [A I r Tax i (sma 11 a I rcraft) Cargo 
2. General 
Aviation 
[
corporate 
ETransportation -----t Private Recreational Industrial (Agricultural, etc) 
3. Military ~ 
I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
B. Supply Subsystems 
Large hubs 
Other hubs 
Commuter 
GA 
I. Airport E 
Military/joint use 
§ Surveillance and Navigation 2. Airways and ATC System--________________ --; Communication Landing Aids 
E Airframe 3. Aerospace Manufacturers ------___ -1-- Engine Avionics 
4. Fuel 
Data Acquisition 
. 
A. User Subsystems 
I. Public Service 
la. Passenger 
Scheduled 
Trunk, etc 
Commuter 
Charters 
Supplemental 
Air Taxi 
lb. Cargo 
2. General Aviation 
2a. Transportation 
Corporate 
Private 
2b. Recreational 
2c. Industrial 
3. Military 
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Table 1.1 
Key Measures of Activity 
of the Aviation System 
Measures 
Revenue passenger miles, 
aircraft revenue hours, 
average stage length 
Airborne speed, available 
seats/aircraft, number 
of aircraft 
Yield (C/RPM), net 
profit, DOC, lac 
RPM, average stage 
length 
RPM 
Number of operations 
Number of operations 
(IFR/VFR), number of 
aircraft, hours flown 
Number of operations 
(IFR/VFR), number of 
aircraft, hours flown 
Number of operations, 
number of aircraft 
Number of operations, 
number of aircraft 
Number of operations 
B. Supply Subsystems 
1. Airports 
1 a. Large Hubs 
lb. Other Hubs 
lc. Commuter 
1 d. GA 
le. Military/Joint Use 
2. Airways and ATC System 
3. Aerospace Manufacturers 
4, Fuel 
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Tab 1 eLl 
continued 
Measures 
Total number, enplaned 
passengers, number of 
operations 
Enplaned passengers, 
number of operations 
(scheduled/GA) 
Enplaned passengers, 
number of operations 
(scheduled/GA) 
Number of operations 
Number of operations, 
number of airports 
Number of operations 
Number of IFR operations, 
(airports, ARTCC), total 
number of operations, 
number of towered airports, 
flight service operations, 
delay measures 
Fuel consumption (jet 
and avgas gallons/year) 
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1.3 1960 R~visited 
In 1960 there was an exciting presidential campaign in the United States 
as Richard Nixon and Jack Kennedy debated on television and radio. Kennedy 
won the debates (although this was disputed by some listeners) and the 
election (although some questions were raised about the decisive ballots 
in Chicago). The value of manned space exploration was being heatedly 
discussed, even as NASA (the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 
which itself had only been established in 1958, replacing NACA, the National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics) tentatively selected 1970 as the year 
for a manned lunar landing. 
In the air transport system, it had been over a year since the first 
turbo jet had been introduced in domestic service (B707-120, December 10, 1958), 
followed quickly by two other turbine-powered aircraft, the turboprop Electra 
(January 23, 1959) and the DC-8 (September 18, 1959). The transition to the 
jet age was well under way. By the end of 1960 the domestic airlines had 
in their inventory 470 turbine-powered aircraft (246 turboprops and 224 turbojets) 
out of a total of 1980 aircraft. The total investment by the domestic 
passenger carriers reached $1.66 billion. For the first time DC-3's carried 
less than half of local service airl ine traffic. 
The airlines had not yet passed the combined bus-railroad intercity 
common carrier passenger mi Ie total (38.8 billion RPM, 49.3% of the total RPMs). 
In fact, in domesti c travel passenger. mi les flown in coach' were sti 11 fewer 
than in first-class (47.2% compared to 52.8%), but,increasingly, faster trips 
as well as 25% discounts were making coach ever more attractive. However, 
the new era was not without its problems. In 1960, there were 0.93 fatalities 
per 100 million rpm in domestic passenger service, notably the second in-flight 
Electra crash (which led to severe speed restrictions on the aircraft, but no 
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grounding) and the mid-air collision between a TWA Super Constellation and-- ','< 
a UAL DC-8 over Brooklyn, New Yor~. 1960 was the worst year for accidents 
since 1951. 
As a result, questions were raised about the efficiency of the FAA 
(Federal Aviation Agency), which had been established in 1958, almost 
coincidentally with the introduction of the 'jets. The higher speeds of 
the turbine-powered aircraft required faster reaction times from the ATC 
system if safety was not to be compromised. Additionally, flight 
delays, diversions, and weather cancellations were estimated to have cost 
the airlines $25-50 million for the year. 
In the economic regulation area, 1960 saw the conclusion of the four-year-old 
General Passenger Fare Investigation (GPFI), in which the CAB (Civil Aeronautics 
Board) decided that a 10.5% return on investment would be proper for the 
trunks. However, a 5% fare increase granted in June 1960 did not help the 
industry achieve this profit; rather, for the year profit shrank to $4 million 
(a 3.4% return), although gross revenues rose to $2 billion. Air cargo 
reached 920 million ton-miles, up from 350 million in 1950. 
While the air transport industry and general aviation were un'der-going 
tremendous growth by practically any operational measure, complaints and 
apparent problems were abundant. In fact, President Kennedy established a 
task force (IIProject Hori'zon") to " redefine and affirm" national aviation 
-goals for the 1960's. Alan Boyd, then the new Chairman of the CAB, wa,s well 
aware of one of the objectives of the Board -to nurture the industry -when 
he reflected on the findings of the GPFI (which had noted tha~whil~ revenue 
growth proceeded unimpeded, profits trended downward since mid-1955 and that 
the "tra'nsition to jet equipment which the industry is now undergoing has 
-11-
presented financial and other problems of a magnitude never before faced." 
[ATA 1961]) 
"Today's low (airline) earnings focus attention on another of our 
immediate problems. Mach 3 (supersonic) is staring us in the face 
Carrier earnings are the only hope for a substantial private enter-
prise contribution to supersonic development -- and the nation must 
develop one. Carrier earnings in the years immediately ahead are the 
only hope that a private enterprise air transport system can absorb 
the next equipment transition. 11 
SSTls, the need for improved earnings, and modernization of the ATC 
System aside, observers of the airline industry noted these additional 
problems facing air transportation in 1960: 
1. Overcapacity and the concomitant need for traffic to fill 
the seats; 
2. Rising cost levels, in particular high wage costs which took up 
42% of total expenses, compared to 23% for materials and services, 
12% for fuel and oil, and 11% for amortization and depreciation; 
3. Nascent noise problems; 
4. Rising subsidy needs by local service carriers (from $15 million 
in 1950 to $37 million). 
~iven all these difficulties, how did the industry survive? 
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2. 1980: The State of Affairs 
2.1 How Did We Get Here? 
By 1980 many things had changed in the air transportation world, but 
low profits and the need for financing new equipment were still primary 
problems for the airlines. Twenty years after the introduction of jets 
(and ten years after widebodies), the airlines were still in turmoil, 
wringing their collective hands about excess capacity, ATC problems, and 
excessive cost levels. Even as passengers enplaned have grown by a factor 
of five and RPMs by seven, only the spectre of the SST has seemingly 
rroved off. (In the meantime GA aircraft have grown by a factor of three 
as well.) What happened to cause the airlines to seemingly return to 
ground zero after a wild rollercoaster ride through the previous twenty years? 
2.1. 1 Population and Income 
On the surface, a growing population would suggest increased travel. 
However, what is really needed is an i'ncrease in those portions of the 
population which: (1) are I ikely to travel (being old enough, for example); and 
(2) can afford it (for business or personal reasons). A large population 
by itself means little as far as ai r travel is concerned (for example, 
India, China), nor does a baby boom portend packed airplanes, at least not 
for a generation. More correctly stated, an increase in the number of 
families or single individuals with "above average" income could indicate a 
potential demand for a.tr travel, ceteris paribus. This Increase can come 
about because of a general increase in income, an increase in the number of 
families, or both. Table 2.1 shows the growth in the number and money 
income of families (and unrelated individuals) from 1960 to 1980. 
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The cause of the higher income family was two-fold: an increase in 
the salary of the main wage earner, complemented by a secondary income. 
The numbe r of work i ng women whose husbands were a 1 so emp loyed rose from 
12.3 mi Ilion in 1960 to 23.8 mill ion in 1979. 
As the number of families with incomes above $25,000 has risen from 
6.1 million in 1960 to 20.2 million in 1979 (and the number of higher-
income individuals has risen from 0.8 million to 5.3 million), the number 
of people who have ever traveled by air has also increased from 36 million 
to 94 million (Table 2.2). 
Table 2.2 shows a decrease in the rate of growth of first-time 
travelers in the last decade, compared to the 1960's. To maintain the level 
of travel that is going on in the U.S., the airlines will increasingly 
depend on the frequent trave ler rather than newcomers to the jet set. 
Twenty percent of the adult population took' an air trip in 1980 (29 million), 
averaging three round trips each. (In 1969 the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey surveys indicated that 5% of all passengers took 40% of 
all trips, indicating that this group of people was flying every week.) 
Not only has the population grown, but it has become better educated 
(or at least has had more schooling). Table 2.3 shows that the number 
of annual college graduates (about evenly divided between male and female) 
has increased from 392,000 in 1960 to 921,000 in 1978. This number, however. 
has been on a plateau since about 1974, reflecting the decreasing growth 
of persons in this age group {Table 2.4).since the family size from 1960 
to 1980 has undergone a major shift. The average family of 1960 had 
3.7 children. In 1965. it was 2.9 children; by 1972. 2.0; and 
from 1975 to 1978 the total fertility rate stabilized around 1.8. Li fetime 
birth expectations of wives across all ages, races, education levels and 
labor force statuses indicate that the two-child family remains highly appealing. 
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What caused this massive shift to the two-child family? Sociologists 
have produced (heavy) volumes on this subject. Fingers have been pointed 
at greater and longer parti cipation in the work force by women, the equal 
rights movement, better education, higher abortion rates, and more 
childless (and unmarried) couples. All these (and many more) factors 
no doubt contri blited. But the fact is that the ferti 1 i ty rate has 
been dropping steadi ly since 1800 (7.0). The baby boom years 
from 1940 (2.3) to 1957 (3.8) can be considered as an aberration 
the rate in the last twenty years has simply resumed its two-century-old 
downward pattern. Where the birth rate will stabilize makes for 
interesting discussions among demographers. 
In addition to births, the population has been swelled by immigration 
(legal and illegal). As the birth rate has declined, legal immigrants 
(400,000 annual"ly) have taken a larger proportion of annual growth, currently 
about 25%. (The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) also estimates 
that there are 800,000 annual illegal aliens entering the United States.) 
Thus, from 1960 to 1980, most demographic indicators were pointing 
to increased air travel: the higher education levels, the return to small-
family formations, and the growth in higher income families. In fact, 
for the first decade of this era, economic growth in the United States 
was explosive. 
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TABLE 2.1 
Money Income (1979 Dollars) 
Fami 1 ies wi th Individuals With 
Incomes $25,000 Total Number Incomes $15,000 
Total Number and Over Unrelated and Over 
of Families (Nurrber in Individuals (Number in 
Year (Mi II ions) Mi II ions) (%) (Millions) Mi II ions) (%) 
1960 45.5 6.1 13.4 II. I 0.8 7.2 
1965 48.5 9.7 20.1 12.2 1.5 12.2 
1970 52.2 15.0 28.7 15.5 2.5 16.2 
1975 56.2 17.0 30.4 20.2 3.4 16.9 
1979 58.4 20.2 34.7 25.6 5.3 . 20.5 
. SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980. 
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Table 2.2 
Percent of P.opulation that has Traveled by Passenger Airline 
1981 1972 1962 
National Results 65% 54% 33% 
Sex 
Men 68 58 37 
Women 62 51 30 
OccuEation 
Professional & Bus i ness 82 75 57 
Clerical and Sales 75 64 45 
Manual Workers 5B 45 26 
Non-Labor Force 55 45 31 
Size of Communitl 
1,000,000 and over 73 65 1/ 
500,000 - 999,999 74 67 42 
50,000 - 499,999 70 58 41 
2,500 - 49,999 60 43 32 
Under 2,500 52 44 n.a. 
Resion of Country 
East 66 57 39 
Mi dwest 61 51 29 
South 56 45 22 
West Bl 70 50 
1/ 500,000 and over. 
Note: Data for 1972 and 1981 based on population 18 years and over, 1962 
based on 21 years and over. 
ATA Chart 
Table 2.3 
High School and College Graduates 
(thousands) 
HI gh School College Graduates 
Graduates Bachelor's De9rees Master's 
Year of % of Persons Per 100 H. S. & Doctor's 
Graduation Number 18 Years Old Number 4 Y rs Earl i er Degrees 
1960 I ,864 72.4 392 28 84 
1965 2,665 70.8 501 25 162 
1970 2,896 77 .1 792 30 274': 
1975 3,140 74.3 923 31 382 
1978 3, 147 74.8 921 30 410 
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1980. 
Total 
Nunber 
of Degrees 
476 .~ 663 , , 
. \ 
-
1 ,066 "'-J , 
1 ,305 
1 ,331 
TABLE 2.4 
U.S. Population by Age Groups (Millions) 
(1960 - 2000) 
Year Total Under 17 (%) 18-21 (%) 22-64 (%) 65 and ove r . (%) 
1960 180.7 64.5 (35.7) 9.6 (5.3) 89.9 (49.8) 16.7 ( 9.2) 
1970 204.9 69.6 (34) 14.7 (7.2) 100.4 (49) 20.1 ( 9.8) 
1975 213.6 66.3 (31 ) 16.5 (7.7) 108.4 (50.7) 22.4 (10.5) 
I 
..... 
1979 220.6 62.5 (28.3) 17 .1 (7.8) 116.2 (52.7) 24.7 (11.2) 00 I 
Series II Projections 
(replacement level fertility (2.1) + 400,000 net immigration) 
1985 233 62.3 (26.7) 15.4 (6.6) 127.9 (54.9) 27.3 (11. 7) 
1990 245 64.8 (26.4) 14.5 (5.9) 134.4 (54.9) 29.8 (12.2) 
2000 260 69.0 (26.5) 15.0 (5.8) 144.7 . (55.7) 31.8 ( 12.2) 
. 
SOURCE: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 198Q. 
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2.2 The Economy and the Aviation System 
One of the more established correlations in air transportation 
is between fluctuations in the economy at large and passenger travel 
(Figure 2.1~ To be sure, GNP does not explain all of the variations. 
In fact, a case can be made that whatever causation exists is in the 
other direction, i.e. it is travel (and its subsidiary industries) which 
causes waves (at least ripples) throughout the economy. The high growth 
industries, such as aviation, push the GNP above a steady-state level, 
since by definition, mature industries move at the same pace as the overall 
GNP. To put matters into perspective, in 1980 aerospace manufacturing 
and air transportation made up 2% of the US GNP (about 1% each). However, 
aerospace exports ($15 billion) constitute over 10% of total U.S. manu-
factured exports. 
Generalizrng, over the past two centuries the increase in Gross 
World Product can be attributed to growth of technological knowledge, 
new forms of transportation, and control over energy (Macrae, 1976). 
During the last seventy years, aviation has done its share to 
raise living standards (expectations, certainly) around the world. 
Closer to home, correlation also exists between U.S. GNP and 
general aviation, as exempl ified by the number of domestic aircraft 
shipments (Table 2;5).Where this correlation is not perfect, special 
circumstances exist. Sales held up remarkably well in 1974-1975 
despite doubling of gasoline prices and the concurrent recession; 
unlike the 1970 slowdown, investment tax credits for companies buying 
capital equipment were available to mitigate the slump. (Business 
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aircraft manufacturers also patted themselves on the back for 
having developed more sophisticated and aggressive sales techniques.) 
For historical purposes, it is sufficient to note these correlations 
without becoming involved in more elaborate analyses. Aviatio~ as all 
sectors of the economy, was booming in the 1960's until, fueled by the 
government-printing-press-financed Vietnam war, inflation started running 
amok in the U.S. This inflation carried over to the 1970's and, compounded 
by instantaneous and massive increases in oil prices, produced the 
unknown economic condition. of stagflatfon. The aviation system was able 
to survive the vicissitudes of these twenty years better than many other 
industries because it was simultaneously undergoing vast technological 
changes. 
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Table 2.5 
GA Aircraft 
Number of Price Number of UnIts (000) Bill ings ($1972) Dec 31. Active GA ($1972%) Shipped 
(Year) Aircraft (000) ~GNP (USA only) (106) (000) 
1960 77 2.2 6.3(E) cumulative 128 (E) 28.0(E) 
81 2.6 5.7(E) 12.0 105 (E) 25.8(E) 
2 84 5.8 5.6{E) 17.6 113 (E) 28.5(E) 
3 85 4.0 6.2 (E) 23.8 125(E) 28.5(E) 
4 89 5.3 7.8 31.6 154 28.0 
65 95 6.0 9.5 41.1 257 36.3 
6 105 6.0 14.8 55.9 370 32.5 
7 114 2.7 10.5 66.4 283 33.9 
8 124 4.6 10.9 77.3 334 37.2 
9 131 2.8 10 .. 0 87.3 532 61'.4 
1970 132 -0.2 5.3 92.6 265 54.6 
1 131 3.4 5.6 98.2 217 40.3 
2 145 5.7 7.5 105.7 419 55.8 
3 1 S4 5.8 10. 1 115.8 598 54.9 
4 162 -0.6 10.0 125.8 621 54.1 
1975 168 -1.1 10.6 136.4 724 54.2 
6 178 5.4 12.0 148.4 895 56.5 
7 184 5.5 13 .3 161 .7 1 ,134 60.9 
8 184 4.8 14.2 175.9 1,294 60.8 
9 199 3.2 14.5 190.4 1 ,600 67.5 
1980 208 -0.2 10.0 200.4 2,100 96.0 
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2.3 r,ternal Avi~tion System Dynamics 
2. 3. I The A I r I I nes 
Beginning in 1958 and continuing through the 1970 1 s, the U.S. 
airlines undertook a complete equipment overhaul. What in 1957 had 
been a 5940 million investment in propeller-driven aircraft had 
turned by 1980 into $20 billion worth of jets. During this period, 
aircraft manufacturers produced a wide variety of airplanes, some of 
which have become economically obsolescent,although still flying in 
various parts of the world (i .e., Convair 880, 990; Sud Aviation 
Caravel Ie; Boeing 720) (Table 2.6 ). Some airplanes retained their 
name while spawning multiple offspring that in some cases were almost twice 
as big as the original designs (Douglas DC-9 series; Boeing 727 and 
737 series). The wide-bodies entered service beginning in January, 1970, 
(Boeing 747) followed shortly by the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 (August, 
1971) and Lockheed L-10ll (Hay, 1972) and, most recently, the Airbus 
Industrie A-300 (1977). A U.S. supersonic transport (SST) underwent 
serious design studies from 1963 (Boeing was selected to build a 
prototype in 1967) until the program died in the U.S. Congress in 1971 
due to a combination of rational and irrational political, ecological, 
and economic causes. 
Regardless of what was happening outside the aviation system, this 
massive equipment acquisition binge resulted in a four-fold increase 
in airline productivity (Table 2.7 ). Productivity was gained by increased 
speed, and, after the fleet had become all jet, by larger aircraft size. 
On the negative side, the jets led to more gallons of jet fuel being 
consumed per revenue-passenger mile, a consequence of little note when 
fuel was 10¢/gallon, but catastrophic at S1.00/gallon (Figure 2.2 ).' 
The introduction of the widebodies reversed this trend; in addition, 
the airlines undertook many fuel conservation measures to Improve fuel 
efficiency. 
The primary beneficiary of this increased productivity was 
the airline passenger. The airlines passed the cost savings along to 
the consumer, as revenues followed costs downwards (in real terms) 
until the first of the energy price increases hit the airline industry 
in 1973 (Figure 2.3). This ability to fly more people (because of the 
speed and size of the new jets) at lower cost led to a phenomenal 
increase in passengers (from 56 to 273 million enplaned) and revenue 
passenger miles (30 billion to 210 billion). 
The airlines' share of the intercity passenger travel on 
common carriers expanded from 45% to 86%, but only a small part of this 
growth was at the expense of the other modes it was mostly new 
traffic. In this period buses slightly expanded their ridership from 
20 to 27 billion passenger miles, while railroads lost 11 billion 
(from 17 to 6 billion). Still, even now airlines have but a small 
(13%) portion of the total intercity travel marke~which is dominated 
by the automobile. (Auto travel itself doubled between 1960 and 1980 
to 1,260 billion passenger miles.) 
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Figure 2.3 shows that the airlines were largely operating just above 
break-even levels as revenues followed costs down, even before deregulation 
made its appearance as a politically, attractive issue. Stockholders in 
airlines were certainly not the big winners as the common stock equity barely 
increased ($300 million versus $170 million) during this period despite 
mUltiplying passengers. Nor was their equity helped, in the early seventies, 
as the wide-bodies came rapidly on 1 ine and excessive capacity forced down 
load factors. This was followed by increased fuel co~ts which airlines were 
hard pressed to pass along due to CAB regulatory lag. The perceived attractiveness 
of deregulation was (and is) based on lower fares due to increased competition. 
However, since fares were already at or near cost levels, the only way fare 
relief could come about was through decreased costs. 
A look at airline operating expenses (Table 2.8) shows that while all 
costs have increased by 50% from 1968 to 1980 ($ 1972) the major culprit has 
been fuel which has gone from 14% (1968) to 31% (198q) of the total costs. 
Airline management has little control over fuel or capital costs; thus labor 
becomes the focus of any major cost decreases. This is indeed what happened 
following the Deregulation Act of 1978. Newly organized airlines did not 
have any advantages in cap'ital or fuel costs, but used their edge in lower-cost 
labor to provide cheaper tickets. 
To compete against these new entrants, the older airlines began to ask 
their employees to work for less (or at least to become more productive). 
Whether the major airlines, with their broad route structures and greater 
financial resources, should or should not match the lowest point-to-point 
fare offered by an upstart is a key decision for maAagement. Should they 
choose "not to be undersold" (and gain concessions from their labor forces to 
make this a realistic threat), the plight of the largely undercapitalized 
new airlines will become the hot new topic of the security analysts' newsletters. 
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Table 2.6 
Commercial Aircraft -- Trends in Characteristics and Productivity 
Type of Plane 
Ford Tri-
Motor 
Dougl as DC-3 
Dougl as Dc-6 
Lockheed Constellation 
Douglas DC-7 
Lockheed Super 
Constellation 
Lockheed Electra 
Boeing 707 
Douglas OC-8 
Boeing 727-200 
Douglas Dc-8-61 
Douglas OC-l0 
Boeing 747 
Concorde 
Date 
of 
First 
Service 
8/ 2(26 
6/25/36 
4/27/47 
6/17/47 
11/29/53 
4/ 1/55 
1/12/59 
10/28/58 
9/18/59 
12/14/67 
2/24/67 
8/ 5/71 
1/22/70 
1/21/76 
Full 
Payload 
Range 
(Hil es) 
570 
500 
2,750 
3,000 
2,800 
4,620 
2,770 
3,000 
4,;00 
1,750 
5,300 
2,760 
5,800 
3,800 
Seats 
14 
28 
56 
64 
99 
99 
98 
181 
176 
189 
259 
380 
490 
100 
Speed 
(mph) 
100 
180 
310 
300 
360 
335 
450 
600 
600 
600 
600 
600 
640 
1,300 
Annual 
ASH's 
(000) 
~': 
4,088 
14,717 
50,691 
56,064 
104,069 
96,842 
128,772 
317,112 
308,352 
331,128 
453,768 
665,766 
915,712 
380,000 
* Assuming a constant utilization of eight'hours per day -- this actually 
ove~states the capacity of older models and understates most of the jets. The 
formula for annual capacity is: seats x hours per day x speed x 365. The 
numbers derived do not reflect actual productivity in commercial service because 
mixed class seating reduces the actual seats and actual cruising speeds are about 
10% under the maximum. 
SOURCE: Ausrotas (1981) 
Table 2.7 
u.s. Domestic Airline Statlstlcs* 
Scheduled Pro-
Avg al rcraft duct I vi ty 
Departure RP~ Stage Enp Yield mllgs Seats (Seats 
Year (000) (10 ) Length (mil) (C/RPH) L.F. (10 ) /A I rcraft Speed X MPH) Enp/Dep 
1960 3,619 30,5S6 227 56.4 6.09 58.5 . 820,756 65.4 235 15,369 15.5 
31,062 225 6.28 55.4 795,169 72.9 253 
2 3,4~6 33,623 240 60.7 6.45 . 52.6 827,694 79.4 274 21,755 17.6 
3 38,457 250 6.17 53.2 888,793 83.4 287 
4 3,693 44,141 259 79.1 6.12 54.8 957,575 86.1 297 25,485 21. 3 
1965 51,888 278 6.06 54.7 1,088,112 89.2 314 
6 4,070 60,590 289 105.8 5.83 57.9 1,178,458 91.2 331 30,096 25.8 
7 4,624 75,487 316 5.64 56.5 1,462,240 94.4 354 
8 4,956 87,507 346 145.8 5.61 52.4 1,715,857 100.8 369 37,195 29.3 
9 5,058 102,717 395 5.79 49.8 2,000,269 109.8 394 
1970 4,794 104,147 421 153.7 6.00 48.9 2,016,321 110.4 403 44,991 30.9 
I 
I 4,680 106,438 425 6.32 48.1 1,992,807 115.3 405 N \D 
2 4.726 118,138 420 172.4 6.40 52.1 1,986,759 118.1 404 47,712 36.4 
I 
3 4,806 126,317 425 6.63 51.9 2,041,000 119.9 404 
. 
4 4.418 129,732 420 189.7 7.52 55.7 1,856,000 126.0 402 50,652 42.8 
1975 4,443 131,656 427 7.68 54.8 1,896,000 127.3 403 
6 4,585 145,271 434 206.3 8.16 55.8 I ,988,000 131.5 406 53,389 44.8 
7 4,695 156,609 445 222.3 8.61 55.9 2,088,000 134.4 408 54.835 47.2 
8 4,772 182,677 456 254.0 8.49 61.5 2,177 ,000 137.6 409 56,278 53.0 
9 5.145 209,064 467 292.6 8.94 63.0 2,402,000 138.6 406 55,865 56.9 
1980 5,130 201,198 478 273.3 11.58 59.0 2,435,!>OO 141.4 405 57,267 53.3 
* 48 states, 50 states after 1968. 
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Table 2.8 
Principal Elements of Airjine Operatirig Expenses 
(Trunk and local Service) 
PERCENT OF OPERATING EXPENSES 
ELEMENT 1968 illQ. 
.llli. .!.2Z! .!.ill. .~ 
Labor 45.2 46.2 41.4 42.4 39.9 36. 1 
Capital 4.0 4.3 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.9 
Fuel 13.8 12.7 19. 1 20.1 24.8 30.5 
Other 37.0 36.8 36.6 34.8 32.7 30.5 
Compos i te 
Cost Index 104.5 120.0 188.7 242.5 280.2 334.4· 
100 = 1967 
Labor 108.0 134.7 208.6 283.8 305.6 332.0 
Capital 105.5 119.8 133.4 152.5 155.8 188.5 
Fuel 98.0 105.8 279.8 376.9 555.8 863. 1 
Imp 1 i cit Price 82.5 91.5 125.6 150.5 162.8 177.5 
Def1 ator (100 == 1972) 
Composite 
Cost Index 126.7 131 • 1 150.2 161 . 1 172. 1 188.4 
(Deflated) 
Labor 130.9 
I 
147.2 t 66.1 188.6 187.7 187.0 
Capital 127.9 130.9 106.2 101 .3 95.7 106.2 I 
Fuel 118.8 i 115.6 222.8 250.4 341.4 486.3 , 
I 
* total operating expenses plus interest on long term debt less depreciatiori 
and amortization 
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2.3.2 The Airports and the ATC System 
The boom in airl ine travel required a substantial investment in 
aviation infrastructure. A few large airports were built during this period 
(Dallas/Fort Worth. Dulles near Washington. D.C .• Kansas City. Houston. 
Tampa), but most of the large city airports met demand by expanding their 
runway and terminal systems. They did this over rapidly increasing objections 
from airport neighborhoods. as in its wake the jet age brought increased 
pollution and noise to the areas surrounding the airports. 
During this period community opposition. combined with protests from 
national environmental groups, caused a number of planned airports to be 
abandoned (notably Everglades in Miami and Palmdale in Los Angeles). New 
York City officials were similarly unable to find an acceptable site for a 
L 
fourth major jetport. The rapid growth in operations at metropolitan airports 
up to 1969 (Table 2.9 ) created severe congestion problems. It was clear 
that no more activity could be tolerated at New York when in July.1968, 
on a clear day. 1.927 aircraft were delayed in taking off or landing -- some for 
up to three hours. Once aircraft were stacked up over New York's airports. 
others bound for New York were forced to remain on the ground until 
the effect caused stacks to develop allover the United States (Aaronson, 1980). 
To rei ieve'the immediate pressure while looking for long-term solutions, 
the FAA created quotas at the busiest airports (New York's LaGuardia and 
JFK, Chicago's O'Hare, Washington's National). Gradually. the airports' 
congestion problem was mitigated by improved airport facil ities, elimination 
of flights at peak periods. and. most importantly, by a larger number of 
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passengers being accommodated by each aircraft operation (Figure 2.4 ). 
Elimination or dilution of GA operations at major airports also helped 
by diverting GA activity to reliever (satellite) airports. (There are 
236 satellite airports in 75 metropolitan areas.) Even so, in 1980, 38% 
of all operations at large hubs were still made by GA aircraft and air 
taxis, while even at some of the busiest GA airports, air carriers coexisted 
with GA activity. GA aircraft were tolerated at most large hub airports 
since they used non-duty runways and utilized the airports at off-peak 
hours. As air carriers expanded their operations, GA activity generally 
decreased, particularly local traffic, as seen in Phoenix (Figure 2.5 and 2.6). 
Large hubs aside, the infrastructure and smaller airports continued 
to grow from 1960 to 1980. (The overall status of U.S. airports is shown 
in Figure 2.7 .) While the total number of airports increased from 7,000 
to 15,000, non-directional radio beacons grew from 200 to 1,000; airport 
traffic control towers from 150 to 500; and instrument landing systems from 
200 to 800 (Table 2.10). A substantial part of this infrastructure 
improvement was in response to growth of general aviation. 
As the jet fleet expanded (and following a number of mid-air 
collisions), the FAA, after the obligatory study (Project Beacon in 1961), 
began to undertake the recommended automation of the ATC system. By 1965 
air route traffic control centers (ARTCe's) had radar coverage of airspace 
above 24,000 feet, where only aircraft equipped for Instrument Flight 
Rule (IFR) flights were permitted (20 ARTCC's existed in 1980). 1965 
also saw the beginning of the Automated Radar Terminal Systems (ARTS) 
in Atlanta. The most advanced systems (ARTS I II) now provide the tower 
controllers with aircraft identity and altitude information of beacon 
equipped aircraft and provide aid for routing and spacing of incoming 
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aircraft. By 1975,63 ARTS I II systems were in place; in 1978 automatic 
potential conflict advisories appeared in ARTS III. In 1970 Terminal 
Control Areas (TCA's) were establ ished whereby aircraft entering TCA's 
were required to have IFR equipment and beacons. Negatively, by 1975 wake 
vortex incidents forced the FAA to add an extra mile separation behind 
wide-body aircraft, reducing IFR operating capacity at airports. 
In 1973, enroute automation took a large step forward when all 
ARTCC's switched to National Airspace System (NAS) Stage A. With Stage A 
software, the following major functions became automated: 
a. receipt and updating of fl ight plans 
b. radar and radar beacon tracking based on mUltiple radar input, 
and display of correlation of the actual track with the flight 
plan. 
In 1972 the FAA 1 inked up FAA headquarters, 20 ARTCC's and 19 high-
density Air Traffic Control Towers. It was this linkage that allowed the 
FAA to implement its computerized "flow control" system housed in a computer 
in Jacksonville, Florida,that keeps track of the supply and demand for 
airspace at the nation's airports. For it is at the airports, ultimately, 
that the bottlenecks in the ATC system occur; no matter how 
smoothly the aircraft are controlled en route, eventually they must land. 
Thus the FAA modernized the ATC system gradually over this period of 
time to meet the growing demand for ATC services. A good description of 
the historical development of the ATC system is found in Gilbert (1973). 
Even when the Professional Air Traffic Controllers' Organization (PATCO) 
strike came in August of 1981, enough automation had been built into the 
system to survive the walkout and subsequent firing of 12,500 (out of 
17,000) controllers, although some capacity reductions at the largest 
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22 airports were put into place. 
A particularly useful way to view the ATC system has been suggested 
by Odoni (1982) and is given in Table ~.Il. This matr~x format relates 
each ATC function (surveillance, navigation, etc.) to a particular phase 
of flight (airport, enroute, etc.). The "national" category was devised 
to accommodate elements of the ATC system that focus upon national rather 
than local roles, and are I ikely to become more important in the future. 
For example, central flow control is I ikely to be replaced by more sophisticated 
strategic plans when improved computer and communication technology is 
ava i 1 ab Ie. 
Based upon this classification, the ATC system that has evolved 
to date is shown in Table 2.12. Brief descriptions of the key elements of 
the ATC system are shown in Table 2.13 (following Schriever ann Seifert, 1968). 
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Table 2.9 
LOCAL/ITINERANT AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS AT AIRPORTS WITH FAA TRAFFIC CONTROL (000.000) 
GA Militar:t 
FY Total Ai r Carrier Itinerant Local Total Itinerant Local Total 
1960 26.4 7.3 8.7 6.3 15.0 2.1 2.0 4.1 
25.6 7.0 9.1 5.8 14.9 1.8 1.9 3.7 
2 27.4 7. I 9.9 6.6 16.5 1.8 2.0 3.8 
3 29.2 7. 1 10.9 7.5 18.4 1.7 2.0 3.7 
4 32.9 7.4 12.4 9.2 21.6 1.8 2.0 3.8 
65 35.6 7.5 13.6 10.8 24.4 1.7 1.9 3.6 
6 41.2 8.2 16.2 13.5 29.7 1.6 1.7 3.3 I 
.t-
o 
7 47.6 8.6 19.0 16.7 35.7 1.5 1.8 3.3 I 
8 53.0 9.9 21.0 18.8 39.8 1.5 1.8 3.3 
9 55.9 10.7 22.3 19.5 41.8 1.5 1.8 3.3 
1970 56.2 10.8 22.6 19.4 42.0 1.5 1.9 3.4 
54.2 10. 1 22.0 18.6 40.6 1.5 2.0 3.5 
2 53.9 9.7 22.4 18. 1 40.5 1.5 2.0 3.5 
3 53.9 9.8 Commuter 22.7 18. 1 40.8 1.5 1.8 3.3 
4 56.8 9.5 2.5 22.9 19.3 42.2 1.3 1.5 2.8 
1975 59.0 9.4 2.7 24.2 20.0 44.2 1.3 1.4 2.7 
6 62.5 9.3 2.9 26.2 21.4 47.6 1.3 1.4 2.7 
7 6'6.7 9.8 3.3 28.1 22.9 51.0 1.3 1.4 2.7 
8 67.2 10. 1 3.8 28.S 22.3 50.8 1.2 1.3 2.5 
9 69.0 10.4 4.4 29.4 22.3 51.7 1.2 1.3 2.5 
1980 66.2 10. 1 4.6 28.3 20.7 49.0 1.2 1.3 2.5 
" 
Year VOR Ending 
Dec. 31 VORTAC 
1960 752 
1961 760 
1962 777 
1963 823 
1964 . 855 
1965 867 
1966 972 
1967 950 
1968 952 
1969 947 
1970 964 
1971 980 
1972 991 
1973 995 
1974 1,000 
1975 1 , a 11 
1976 1,020 
1977 1,021 
1978 1,020 
1979 I, 028 
SOURCE: FAA 
Table 2.10 
FAA AIR ROUTE FACILITIES AND SERVICES: 1960-1979 
. Non- Ai r Route Airport Fl ight Inst.I"IJ-
Directional Traffi c Traffic Service ment 
Radio Control Control Landing 
Beacons Centers Towers Systems 
190 35 153 335 191 
177 36 184 338 216 
222 35 202 336 228 
278 32 210 336 237 
275 29 212 331 247 
286 28 226 331 257 
477 28 238 331 268 
491 28 255 330 264 
538 27 271 329 279 
589 27 281 337 288 
640 27 288 332 310 
669 27 347 331 337 
706 27 355 324 403 
739 27 403 315 467 
793 27 417 320 490 
848 26 487 321 580 
920 25 488 321 640 
959 25 495 319 678 
988 25 494 319 698 
I ,015 25 499 318 753 
Ai rport 
Survei I lance 
Radar 
52 
65 
70 
76 
74 
77 
91 
117 
111 
124 
120 
122 
125 
llf2 
156 
177 
175 
182 
185 
192 
I 
.c-
Table 2.11 
ATC ClassIfication Format 
Terminal Area 
~ Terminal Airport/Final Funct Ion National Oceanic En Route AI rspace Approach 
Navigation/ 
landing Aids 
Communications 
(Air/Ground) . 
(Ground/Ground) 
Surveillance 
Control Process/ I z:o 
Separation N I 
Assurance 
Weather 
Detection 
. 
flight Planning 
Assistance and 
Information 
---- - ---
~----~-----
--
locat Ion F~ Nat lonal 
Navigation/landing • VOR/OHE 
Aids 
• VORTAC 
• VOR 
• RNAV 
;-OMEGA--------
• lORAN-C 
Conrnunlcatlons 
(Air/Ground) • VHF/HF Voice 
(Ground/Ground) 
Surve ill ance • ATCRBS 
Table 2.12 
Baseline ATC System (1981) 
Oceanic En Route 
• Inertial (see Nat lona 1) 
--;-OHEGA--
• HF Voice (see National) 
• Pilot • ARSR 
Reports (Also see 
National) 
~--
Terminal Area 
Terminal Airspace Airport/Final Approach 
(see National) 
• IlS 
• NOB 
• lighting Facilities 
(Also see National) 
I 
~ 
U> 
(see National) (see Nat lona I) I 
• ASR • ASR 
(AI so see • ASOE 
Nat lonal) (Also see National) 
Location 
Control Process/ 
Separation 
Assurance 
Weather 
Detection 
Flight Planning 
Assistance/ 
Information 
National 
• Central Flow 
Control 
• Cont Ingency 
Command Post 
• National Weather 
Service 
• Pilot Reports 
• Flight Service 
Stations 
• Flight Service 
Stations 
• Central Flow 
Weather Service 
Unit 
Table 2.12 
Baseline ATC System (1981), continued 
OceanIc 
• Procedural 
• National 
OceanIc 
and 
Atmospheric 
Administra-
tion 
(see National) 
En Route 
• 9020 Computer 
• HAS Software 
• En Route 
Metering 
• En Route 
Conflict Alert 
• En Route MSAW 
(Also see 
Nat i ona I) 
(see National) 
Terminal 
Terminal Airspace 
• UNIVAC Computer 
• ARTS IliA/ARTS 
III/ARTS II 
Software 
• Terminal Conflict 
Alert 
• Terminal MSAW 
(Also see National) 
(see National) 
• Central Altitude I (see National) 
Reservat Ion 
(Also see 
National) 
Area 
Airport/Final Approach 
• UNIVAC Computer 
• ARTS IlIA/ARTS III/ 
ARTS II Software 
• Terminal Conflict Alert 
• Terminal MSAW 
(Also see National) 
• Airport Instrum'n 
• Low Level Wind 
Shear 
(Also see National) 
• Airport Reservation 
Office 
(Also see National) 
, 
.r:-
.r:-, 
tlavigational 
Aid 
Automatic Direction 
Finder (AOn 
VHF Omnlrange (VOR) 
Distance Measuring 
Equipment (DHE) 
loran-C 
Table 2.13 
Summary of Radio Navigation Aids 
Function 
Oetermlnes bearing 
to IF beacon 
stations and IF 
radio stations 
Determines magnetic 
bearing to VOR 
Measures slant 
range to DHE 
faci I I ty 
Determines aircraft 
position 
Unit 
Cost 
$9,000 
11,000 
8,000 
20,000 
System 
Accuracy 
+20 (20);very low 
frequency random 
error 
+30 (20)ivery low 
frequency random 
error 
+0.2 nml or 1% 
of range; ve ry 
low frequency 
random error 
+1500 ft (20); 
ground wave at 
extreme range 
not on baseline 
Range 
(llautical 
Hi les) 
50-200 nml 
depending on 
signal strength 
and noise level 
Line of sight 
R::1.231h 
h a altitude, kft 
0-192 
Night'" 1000 
Day 'V 1300 
Remarks 
A general purpose 
aid 
This unit is a 
combination VOR, 
localizer, and gllde-
slope navigation unit. 
For high altitude 
operations, mutual 
interference among I 
VOR facilities may';; 
limit usefulness to I 
critical ar~as; e.g. 
terminal area 
As with the VOR, 
mutual Interference 
among facilities at 
high altitudes may 
limit usefulness to 
a f~w critical areas, 
e.g., terminal area 
This system 
operat lona I. 
Velocity aiding 
essential on high 
performance air-
craft from external 
sources such as 
air data and heading 
or an inertial sensor 
Navigat lanai 
Aid 
Omega 
Doppler Navigator 
Air Traffic 
Control transponder 
Instrument landing 
System (glideslope 
and localizer) (llS) 
Hlcrowave landing 
System 
Table 2.13 (continued) 
Function 
Determines 
aircraft position 
Determines vector 
distance traveled 
Provides Identi-
fication and 
altitude reporting 
to air traffic 
controllers 
Provides directional 
Information for poor 
weather landing 
Same as ILS 
Unit 
Cost 
$25,000 
System 
Accuracy 
+2 nml (20);nlght 
+1 nmi (20) ;day 
Tow frequency 
random error 
Range 
(Nautical 
Hi les) 
6000 
~O,OOO +0.5~ (20) of 200 
~,OOO 
10,000 
15,000 
distance traveled 
or I nmi; very low 
frequency random 
error 
0.20 (20) 
0.1°(20) 
200 
:: 20 
Rc:marks 
Th i!. sys tem Is 
operat lana I 
U!.e for SST 
altitude!. and 
speeds would 
require ~re trans-
mitter power and 
a more directional 
antenna 
I 
.to 
Altitude reporting ~ 
In 100 ft Incre-
ments up to 100 kft. 
Operational 
Better protection 
from multlpath 
relative to ILS 
Nav I gat lona I 
Aid 
Harker beacon 
Ilavstar 
Table 2.13 (continued) 
Function 
Indicates to pilot 
distance to end of 
runway 
Hilltary Satellite 
Navigation System 
Unit 
Cost 
700 
System 
Accuracy 
~25.000 200m(2a) 
Range 
(Nautical 
Hi lesl Remarks 
Capable of 
higher accuracy '~ 
for m I II tary users '";' 
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2.3.3 General Aviation 
By many measures of activity, general aviation is the largest component 
of the aviation system and has become more so over the last twenty years 
(Figures 2.8 and 2.9). In terms of number of aircraft, number of operations, 
and hours flown, GA has expanded faster than air carrier activity. All 
aspects of GA activity have increased, but business flying has been lagging 
personal, instructional;and commercial usage (Table 2.14). Since 1970, however, 
it is the itinerant flights which have grown faster than local flights, 
indicating more sophisticated flying by the GA fleet (Table 2.9). This is 
verified by the greater growth of larger aircraft in the GA fleet since 1973, 
although the single engine piston aircraft still dominates the GA fleet 
(Table 2.15). 
General aviation, magnitude aside, is a vital part of the aviation system. 
It provides transportation to individuals and businesses which otherwise 
have poor access to the public air transportation system. Thus GA contributes 
to the regional development of areas which, because of location or lack of 
population, have been inadequately served by the scheduled air carriers. 
GA provides rapid medical help to isolated areas -- the Flying Physicians 
Association is thriving. Agricultural aircraft improve farm efficiency and 
lead to increased food production. GA aircraft manufacturers also contribute 
to the positive export picture of the aerospace industry ($ 500 million in 1979). 
Finally, there is no denying the pleasure that thousands of citizens (there 
are 800,000 licensed pilots in the US) derive from emulating the Wright 
brothers. 
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1960 US CIVIL AIR FLEET 
Air Carrier: 2,100 (5 %) 
GA 109,000 
1960 CIVIL OPERATIONS AT FAA AIRPORTS 
Air Carrier: 7.3MilJion (32%) 
GA 
15 Million 
1960 FLYING TIME 
Air Carrier: 3.5 Million (21%) 
GA 13.1 Million 
Source: FAA 
FIGURE 2.8 COMPARISON OF GA AND AIR CARRIER 
ACTIVITY - 1960 
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1979 US CIVIL AIR FLEET 
General Aviation 
247,847 Aircraft 
98.5 % 
1979 FLYING TIME 
General Aviation 
43.3 Million Hours 
85.1 % 
Source: FAA 
Air Cqrrier 
3,669 Aircraft 
1.5 % 
1979 CIVIL OPERATIONS AT FAA 
TOWERED AIRPORTS 
General Aviation 
56.1 Mi Ilion Operations 
84.4% 
Air Carrier 
7.6 Million Hours 
14.9 % 
Air Carrier 
10.4 Million 
• Operations 
15.6 % 
FIGURE 2.9 COMPARISON OF GENERAL AVIATION AND 
. . 
AIR CARRIER ACTIVITY IN 1979 
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Table 2.14 
Hours Flown in GA Aircraft (000,000) 
FY Total Business Commercial Instructive Personal & Other 
60 13. 1 5.7 2.4 1.9 3. 1 
61 13.4 5.8 2.5 1.8 3.3 
62 14.0 5.7 2.8 2.1 3.4 
63 14.8 5.7 3.2 2.4 3.5 
64 15.5 5.9 3.4 2.6 3.6 
65 16.2 5.8 3.3 3.0 4. 1 
66 18.9 6.5 3.4 4.5 4.5 
67 21.6 6.8 3.7 6.0 5. I 
68 22.9 6.8 4. I 6.4 5.6 
69 24.8 7.2 4.8 6.7 6.1 
70 26.0 7.2 4.6 6.8 7.5 
71 25.5 7.1 4.3 6.4 7.6 
72 27.0 7.2 4.8 6.8 8. 1 
73 30.0(Rev) 8.6 5.6 7.6 8.2 
74 31.4 9.1 6.3 8.0 9.0 
75 32.0 9.5 6.5 8.2 10.0 
76 33.9 10. 1 7.0 8.6 10.4 
SOURCE: FAA 
-52-
Table 2.15 
GROWTH OF ACTIVE GENERAL AVIATION FLEET BY AIRCRAFT TYPE, 1973-1979 
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT (OOO) 
Compound 
Annual 
Ai rcraft Growth 
Type 1973 1979 Rate in :'6 
FIXED WING 
I-engine piston 51 62 3.3 
1-3 seats 
I-engine piston 75 106 6.0 
4+ seats 
2-engine piston 13 17 3.9 
1-6 seats 
2-engine piston 5 8 7.9 
7+ seats 
2-engine turboprop 3 15 
1-12 seats 
2-engine turboprop 0.5 0.5 1.0 
13+ seats 
2-engine turbojet 1.2 2.3 11.6 
Other turboj et 0.2 0.3 10.9 
ROTORCRAFT 
Piston 2 3 6.7 
Turbine 3 18.4 
OTHER 2 5 13.8 
TOTAL AI RCRAFT 153 210 5.4 
SOURCE: General Aviation Activity and Avionics Survey (1979) 
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3. How Do We Get from Here (1980) to There (2000)? 
3.1 Introduction 
The lot of the forecaster is not a happy one. The forecasts will 
(usually) be wrong and the person making them is (usually) fully aware 
of this. To remain in their line of work, forecasters cannot focus 
on results alone, but rather upon the nature of the forecasting process. 
When results go awry, they must stand ready to improve (or discard) the 
theory that led them astray. By paying attention to the process rather 
than to the results, soothsayers retain their sanity and sometimes even 
their clients. 
The prediction of even the simplest event, e.g., the toss of a coin, 
has its own rules: lIin the long run ll an "unbiasedll coin will come up heads 
fifty per cent of the time. gut of what use is this theory to the captain 
of the football team when he goes on the field to call the coin toss? Well, 
he will not be blamed if the coin does not fall his way; after all, it was 
a fifty-fifty chance. Would it have helped to study the past coin tosses 
by the official? Suppose he had thrown nothing but heads in the last twenty 
chances? Is this information useful? What should the captain do? 
Thus the predictions of events can be attempted using theories based 
on probability and statistics. Forecasters, if they are of an analytic 
turn of mind, can stay happy even guessing wrong, especially when they 
apply themselves to more complex events. Who will win the World Series? 
Will the Dow Jones Industrial Average climb above 2000? What are the 
chances that there wi 11 be a recession next year? Wi 11 \~orld War I J I occur 
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before the year 2000? -- although clearly a different meaning of probability 
applies here. 
The baseball forecaster, armed with seasons of batting averages for 
hitters and earned run averages for pitchers, will attempt to assess the 
chances of any team against another. In the long run, a superior team 
(on paper) will win, but in anyone game or even one season "strange ll 
events take place (the Impossible Dream· of Boston Red Sox '67, New York 
Mets '66). It is possible to construct an entire imaginary world based 
on statistics (Coover, 1968). A pseudo-real istic game can be played 
where real baseball averages are combined with the rolling of 
dice to simulate the world of seasons past, as the dice provide 
the missing element of chance (the lIinches" of the game). Thus, to 
the question concerning the World Series, a rational answer would 
be based on an analysis of past performances of the members of the teams 
involved ("Smith hit .203 against left-handers, with runners in scoring 
position, with less than two out, in Tiger Stadium"). The forecasts may 
be wrong, but prediction itself is fun, given the conviction of each analyst 
(fan, sportswriter, manager) that he or she alone has the right analytical 
tools (IIBut only on cloudy days !"). Sti 11, overall causes and effects 
are fairly straightforward, as are the cliches ("Good pitching will beat 
good hitting anytime"). Horseracing systems largely follow the same line 
(basing predictions on past performance), with the added fillip of tracking 
the pedigrees qf young colts and fillies. 
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With the Dow Jones average, or the market, or even anyone stock in 
particular, another level of complexity arises. Many facts exist related 
to the companies (e.g., profit, capitalization, ranking within the industry) 
and to the movement of the stock price' (e.g., price/earninys ratios, volume, 
short interest, daily highs and lows). Analysts of the stock market belong 
to one of two schools, the fundamentalists and the technicians (although 
some claim to combine the best of each). The pure technicians, or chartists, 
will only look at the motion of the stock price and attempt to predict its 
future based on established systematic patterns of the past (trendlines, 
flags, inverted V's, five point reversals, etc.) Some systems are arcane 
enough that two analysts will predict totally different trends looking at 
the same chart. More sophisticated technicians will add such factors 
as up-down volume, wei,ghted moving averages, market breadth, etc. Still, 
the technicians basically look at the behavior of the stock price, rather 
than the company. Little do they care whether they are looking at U.S. 
Steel or Apple Computer; in their world, everything has been discounted by 
the market. 
Fundamentalists, at the other extreme, do not care what the price of 
the stock is, only what it should be. They analyze the company (trends in 
profit, return on investment, dividend payout, the book value, debt/equity 
ratios, etc.), compare it to other companies in the same industry, and 
attempt to estimate what the net value of the company should be (properly 
discounted, of course). If the price of the stock does not match its imputed 
value, then the stock is considered overpriced (or undervalued) and should 
be sold (or bought). Market dynamics are of no concern to the fundamentalist. 
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The dichotomy is not total; some fundamenta.1 anCl.ly,S,ts wi 11 ass ign risk 
factors to stocks based on their volatility; some technicians will group 
stocks within industries. The fundamental ist school attempts to discern 
long term trends within the company and the industry in which it operates; 
the technical school focuses on short term advice based on a mixed bag 
of statistics, market models, and sheer bravado (Adam Smith, 1968, 1972). 
Whether either school is correct or whether stock prices are engaged in 
"random walks" remains an interesting, and unending, debate. Certainly 
the random walk theory provides a nifty fall-back position to forecasters 
who happen to guess wrong. Still, practitioners of forecasts on Wall Street 
appear to have a good time regardless of the outcomes of their analyses. 
(119ut where are the customers I yachts?lI) 
In the broader question of where the national economy is going, the 
old fashioned judgemental forecasts of changes in the GNP (and the rate 
of inflation) are pass:. (Change in GNP traditionally was forecasted 
based upon expected changes in government spending, changes in fixed 
investment, changes in personal consumption, changes in inventories 
and changes in net exports.) In vogue now are colossal computer based 
econometric models with very fine (disaggregated) sets of economic variables. 
Yet, the results of econometric forecasts (by such firms as Chase 
Econometrics, Data Resources, Inc. and Wharton Econometric Forecasting 
Associates) have been no more remarkable than the older types. -Certainly, 
since all forecasters are wrong, they should be judged more on their credibility 
rather than their accuracy. Credibility, at least, seems enhanced working 
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with a small set of numbers rather than with reams of computer printout based 
on tenuous relationships, all the while subject to the usual caveats of 
econometrics: that the underlying economic structure is not changing and 
that it is easier to forecast the explanatory rather than the final variables. 
Aviation forecasting lies somewhere between tossing coins and predicting 
when (and if) World War I I I will break out. Certain events are fairly 
predictable, for example, technological improvements in aircraft and ATC 
systems. Other outcomes are too much subject to influence by human beings, 
both inside and outside the aviation system, to be assigned more than a 
small probabil ity; a combination of these probabilities presents an even 
lesser likel ihood. For example, the future of economic regulation of the 
airlines may depend on the influence of labor unions in Congress or the 
safety record of new entrants. Ultimately, the forecaster has little choice 
but to rely on the old economist's bromide, ceteris paribus, and to plow on. 
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3.2 The Airlines 
There are a number of ways of estimating the expected future growth 
of revenue passenger miles, the most useful aggregate statistic in the 
airline business. The easiest is to simply plot the data and try some 
extrapolation, i.e., curve fitting. Assuming that growth will terminate 
at some time, useful curves are logistic S-shaped curves and Gompertz curves, 
symmetrical or non-symmetrical growth curves where the percentage growth 
gets smaller over time. Rolls-Royce (1981) shows a logistic curve 6n which 
RPMs hit 300 billion in the year 2000. (Figure 3.1) 
The next level of sophistication comes when the RPM statistic is broken 
down into its parts. Total RPMs are equal to total aircraft revenue miles 
multiplied by the average aircraft load. These in turn are made up of the 
number of fl ights times the length of the flight (or the number of departures 
times average stage length) and the average load factor times the average 
aircraft size. These statistics are shown in Figure 3.2 going back to 1960 
and projected out to the year 2000. Assuming that the load factor and departures 
will remain approximately the same as over the last ten years and that aircraft 
size and average stage length continue to grow as shown in Figure 3.2, then: 
RPM = (No. of departures x average stage length) x (average load 
factor x average aircraft size) 
RPM (year 2000) = (5 x 106 x 600) x (0.55 x 200) = 330 billion 
This number can, of course, be moved up or down by so changing the various 
components to taste. Anything from 300 - 360 billion would not be unreasonable. 
The result is thus not far from the logistic curve. 
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These two methods do not require any explanation as to why the 
variables are moving around; they are only trend analyses assuming underlying 
causes will continue to affect the variables as they have in the past; 
Moreover, since its inception air travel had been a (very) high growth 
industry, reflecting simultaneous improvement in the quality of the service 
and a decrease in its cost. 
Seeking a quantifiable explanation for the growth of air travel, 
Wallace (1979) argued that RPMs were a function of both the traveler's 
abil ity to purchase travel and the quality of the product that he purchased. 
As a proxy for the ability to buy travel at any given time, Wallace chose 
to divide the GNP of that year by the yield to the airlines (revenue per 
passenger mile, itself a proxy for the price of a ticket to the average 
traveler). GNP accounts for both business and personal income expansion, 
and in current dollars also accounts for inflation. Thus, if GNP (wages) 
is inflating faster than the yield, the buying index increases, indicating 
that it is easier to purchase tickets. 
The buying index (for any year i) is B. = GNP index 
I 
yield index 
Quality improvements came from both technology (faster, larger,and 
longer range aircraft) and from the growth of the airline industry, resulting 
in service increases (additional cities served, more timely and frequent 
schedules, more direct flights). Quality of service,then,is a function of 
convenience, comfort and speed proxies for which are aircraft revenue miles, 
seats per aircraft and average aircraft speed. The quality index is defined as: 
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Qi = 1 + 0.5 {aircraft revenue miles i - miles 1960)/miles1960 
+ (average aircraft seats i - seats1960)/seats1960 
+ (average aircraft speed i - speedi)/speed1960 
These indices are shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. 
Figure 3.4 shows that the quality index tripled between 1960-1969 
indicating that technological improvements (the conversion to jets) had 
a' greater impact than price during the 1960's. However, since 1970 
the climb has been much slower. The speed component has stabilized 
while the comfort factor has continued to climb (the addition of wide-bodies 
and bigger derivatives of early jets). The convenience of air travel also 
stabil ized in the early 1970's, but has been increasing recently. The 
ability-to-buy index (Figure 3.3) reflects the fact that the price of travel 
at times increased faster than the economy was expanding, leading to a 
decreased ability to purchase tickets in 1974 and 1980, years of stagnation 
and finally absolute decrease in RPMs. 
Using these buying and quality indices, a demand model can be constructed 
by analyzing the historical relationship between these pseudo-causative variables 
and passenger traffic. Postulating that 
~ log R. = a 6 log B. + e 6 log Q. 
I I I 
and performing a regression analysis on the data yields the following results: 
a = 0.783 standard error = 0.158 
e = 0.610 standard error = 0.148 
T = 4.954 
T = 4.119 
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The model is statistically s9und .. It has a good statistical fit 
(multiple R = 0.92). The F ratio is high (52.2). F Ratio compares the 
explained variance (due to regression) to the unexplained variance (error 
sum of squares). A high F Ratio generally indicates that all of the regression 
coefficients are not statistically equivalent to zero. The T statistics 
validate this point. Generally, a T statistic greater than 2.0 means 
that the coefficients are significant. The standard error of the estimate 
is low (0.02). Finally, the signs of the coefficients are correct. 
The delta log equation shows percentage changes in the passenger 
index from one year to the next related to percentage changes in B. and 
I 
Q •. A 10% increase in B. and Q. will lead to a 14% increase in R .. The 
I I I I 
. 
ability to buy tickets appears slightly more important than the quality of 
service in generating domestic air travel. 
Based on this model, a monograph can be constructed using indices 
for GNP, Yield and Quality of Service (Figure 3.5). With the monograph it 
is possible to explore a range of values for the independent variables 
and quickly obtain an estimate for future traffic. But what are likely 
values for these variables by the year 20007 
The components of the ability-to-buy variable are yield and GNP. 
Yield, the revenues the airlines receive per passenger mile, is affected 
by many things: the degree of competition on the airline's network 
(the much noted fare wars since deregulation); management strategy (cutting 
fares to stimulate traffic is ~ popular gambit; not willing to be undersold 
is in vogue too); the amount of seasonal traffic on an airline's network 
(flying near-empty planes to retain landing slots at airports). Still, 
ultimately yield must be equal to or higher than cost, as it has been in 
the past (Figyre 3.6, Table 3.1) or else the airl ine closes. 
'.~ 
. .....-. 
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The major components of cost are fuel, labor, and capital 
(Figure 3.7). As noted earlier, it is the fuel component which had 
been rising ever faster (Table 3.2), as the official OPEC price 
per barrel of oil seemingly doubled at will (Figure 3.8). However, 
these ev.er higher prices have naturally led to more exploration and 
production a.~ non-OPEC countries tried to get in on the fun. 
Fears of a world wide shortage of fossil fuels 
(lithe energy crisis") have predictably led to a surplus of oil as the 
"well-advertised views of the decision-influencers tend to be believed 
by both profit-seeking private producers and consensus-following governments, 
and these two then combine to cause excessive production of precisely the 
things that the decision-influencers had been saying would be most obviously 
neededll (Macrea, 1972). Worl d-wi de recess ions and energy conservat ion 
measures also helped create the surplus by cutting consumption. 
Even as OPEC production has gone down from 1978's 63% of the 
world share to 50% in 1981, OPEC has attempted to cut its production further 
to eliminate the oil glut and thus maint~in a higher price. With a maximum 
capacity of 32 millions of barrels per day (mbpd) OPEC was pumping 
22 mbpds in 1981~ with Saudi Arabia absorbing the largest cuts. 
There is some (heated) debate about the·future of oil prices and 
availability. The optimists note that the OPEC countries (especially 
the non-Gulf states) have development plans which depend on selling all 
the oil they can produce, and price (almost) be hanged. Thus availability, 
at least, is not seen as a problem, of course barring (another) major 
Middle East crisis, especially if it involves Saudi Arabia. As the non-OPEC 
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countries' production grows (Figure 3.9), price stability is foreseen. 
The pessimists observe that exploration for oil is diminishing as the price 
has stabilized (and surpluses exist); that the switch to alternative fuels 
is slowing (IIExxon abandons the Colorado shale project"; "Another nuclear 
plant halted"); and that the world may be at OPEC's mercy once again. 
While it is tricky to predict what the price of oil will be, 
eight-fold increases (as between 1973-1981) seem farfetched; renewed 
energy crisis talk wi~l certainly activate the Macrea effect. What is not 
difficult to predict is that conservation and efficiency measures (for 
example, more seats per aircraft) and fuel efficient aircraft (757, 767, 737-300, 
OC-9-80, A 300 series) will bring up the RPM/gallon figure as the year 2000 
approaches (Figure 3.10). For the airlines, the fuel component is predicted 
to rise no faster than general inflation, and perhaps less, if the airlines 
can afford to reequip their fleets with advanced-technology aircraft. 
The labor cost has traditionally been high in the airline industry, 
with the average worker receiving approximately twice the annual salary of 
other U.S. industrial wage earners. Under regulation, when the CAB based the price 
of all airline tickets on average industry costs, it was a relatively simple 
matter to pass on to the public the wage increases that the labor unions 
extracted. Those airlines whose managements tried to keep their labor costs 
as low as possible (either by hiring relatively fewer workers or by maintaining 
pay scales below industry standards, or both) usually had high profits, 
Northwest Airlines was the most notable follower of this strategy. 
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Since deregulation. as the price of the ticket became based on what 
the market will bear, airline managements have taken a much harder I ine:in 
labor negotiations as they saw non-union, low-paying upstarts (and low priced 
tickets) invading their markets. Airlines which have been under severe financial 
stress (i.e., Braniff before bankruptcy, Continental, Eastern, Pan Am, Republic, 
Western) have even been able to persuade their workers to cut back their salaries. 
The May, 1982,Braniff bankruptcy will, among other things, add a certain 
amount of caution to management-union discussions, as both sides will be more 
aware of the alternative to labor peace and cooperation. With this spirit of 
cooperation, however, labor will insist on closer surveillance of management 
decisions. (Indeed, the unions already have a member on the board of directors 
of Pan Am J 
Deregulation thus has drastically cut the power of labor ~nions. 
Although the discussions preceding deregulation were long and acrimonious, 
it was basically a debate whether the airlines should be viewed as public 
utilities or as normal industries where market forces shape prices, 
rather than regulatory agencies. Since the pro-competitive arguments won 
the day by promising lower fares, deregulation is likely to remain the law in 
the future unless a series of accidents occur whose causes will beattributed 
to lack of care in the operation of aircraft due to the desire to cut costs. 
Regulation of fares can also return if airl ines start raising the prices of 
tickets in non-competitive thin markets so high that Congressional investigations 
occur. These scenarios, however, are not very likely. The FAA is still regulating 
the airlines as far as safety is concerned; very high fares will eventually 
attract new entrants. Thus the labor component of cost will not rise 
faster than inflation, and may in fact decrease. 
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Once the decision has been made to borrow money, airl ine managements 
have no control over their capital costs, which are tied to the average 
prime rate charged by banks (Figure 3.11). These interest rates have traditionally 
moved up and down with the inflation rate (the rule of thumb for the prime 
rate had been inflation rate plus three percent), except in the past two 
years when they have remained uncharacteristically high. Many reasons have 
been advanced for this aberration. Fear in the capital markets that the 
decline in inflation is illusionary or, alternatively, that the Federal 
Reserve Board will not stay the course in the fight against inflation,are 
major psychological reasons. Lack of confidence in the major premises of 
the Reagan Administration economic policies is another. Heavy borrowing by 
the Treasury to underwrite the existing (and growing) Federal budget deficits 
is certainly a real factor. Whether the prime rate remains high or not, 
airline managements will not be able to do anything about their capital 
costs, which will ultimately be correlated with inflation. Relative to 
current GNP growth, capital costs will be neutral. 
Thus the major components of airline costs (fuel, labor, capital) 
are seen to be equal to or somewhat below the inflation rate over the next 
twenty years. Consequently,yields will remain steady in real terms or 
decl ine sl ightly. 
High inflation has contradictory effects on travel. If GNP inflation 
stays ahead of yield inflation, it is positive for travel. For people whose 
income is not indexed to inflation, high inflation reduces real income and 
propensity to travel. On the other hand, inflationary expectations (and 
interest deductions on taxes) lead people to borrow and spend now while 
expecting to repay with cheaper dollars. 
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GNP growth is hardest to predict, from year to year or even decade 
to decade; witness the plethora of economic forecasting experts. Unless the 
U.S. economy suffers a major collapse (and causes world-wide hunger in the 
process), over the next twenty years the long-term U.S. trend (since 1910) 
of 3% average annual real growth should continue. (Productivity, however, has 
been declining recently.) Even at the risk of aggravating inflation, 
no U.S. government tries to retain conditions suitable to a recession past 
its third year in office. Wall Street recognizes this. Since Truman, no matter 
which party was in' the White House, in the third year the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average rose anticipating that the Federal Government would attempt 
to stimulate economic growth before the next election (Figure 3.12). 
Being slightly more pessimistic, since the days of cheap energy 
have passed from the U.S. scene, 2.5% real annual growth over the next twenty 
years seems reasonable. This means that GNP in the year 2000 will be 1.6 x GNP 1980 , 
in real terms. Since the yield has been estimated as staying within the inflation 
rate the buying index is: 
of 
The quality of service components by the year 2000 -- speed, convenience 
service, comfort -- are likely to be as follows: 
a) speed wi 11 be the same 
b) convenience (aircraft revenue miles) will increase to 3.5 x 109 
miles as there will be more point-to-point service by new entrants, 
old local service airl ine~ and regional airlines using small~r 
planes (737-DC9 size). 
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c) comfort (seats per aircraft) will rise to 200 seats, but this 
component will only be half as important as it has been over the 
past twenty years since a higher level of comfort is now assumed 
as given. 
Q2000 = 1 + 0.5 (aircraft revenue miles 2000 - mi1es1980)/miles1980 
+ 0.5 (average aircraft seats2000 - seats1980)/seats1980 
+ (average aircraft speed2000 - speed1980)/speed1980 
Q2000 = 1 + 0.5(3.5 x 109 - 2.5 x 109)/2.5 x 109 + 0.5(200 - 140)/140 
+ (400 - 400)/400 
Q2000 = 1.4 
Thus by the year 2000 the qual ity of service will be 40% higher than 
it was in 1980. Using the model: 
RPM2000/RPM2000 = (62000/61980)°.78 x (Q2000/Q1980)O.61 
RPM /RPM (1 6) 0.78 x (1.4)0.61 = 1.77 2000 1980 = . 
Consequently revenue passenger miles for the year 2000 are projected as 356 
billion. This is a compounded growth rate of slightly less than 3%, compared 
with the previous two estimates of 300 billion and 330 billion rpms, which 
were 2.0% and 2.5% growth rates, respectively. All of these guesses fall 
within the shaded area shown in Figure 3.13. The principal caveat of forecasting 
should not be forgotten -- the final result is only as good as the assumptions 
that have been used. If any components (GNP, fuel, labor, etc) change drastically 
from what has been forecasted, the final estimate will be off -- up or down. 
In general these estimates indicate that the airline industry will behave more 
like a mature industry rather than the robust growth industry of the past 
twenty years when simultaneous quality improvements and unit cost decreases 
combined for explosive expansion. 
en 
c 
o 
(l) 
I 
350 
300 
250 
200 
/ 
/ 
" 
I 
1/ 
/ 
en 19 40 1950 1960 1970 J 1980 ~ 150 
a.. 
a:: 
100 
50 I 
o -..---
-4 
/ 
V ~ 1 I 
-3 -2 -I 
Source: Rolls - Royce (1981) 
W 
, 
o 
,....-----
---
--
-" 
, ,.,,-
./ 
/ 
~ 
1/ 
/' 
. 
1990 2000 2010 2020 
I 1 I I I 
2 3 4 5 6 
FIGURE 3.1 US CERTIFICATED AIR CARRIER GROWTH 
I 
'" co I 
100 
ro ------------
60. , ...... , 
, ................. '. _#_--J 
50 " .. .."I- ------------
Load Factor 
40 (%) 
30 
20 
10 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
Average Aircra ft 
Size ( x 10) 
Depa r ture s 
(106 ) 
-,---Av. Stage Leng t h 
(x 100) 
--
---
--
--
--
---
--
- - - - - --r-- c::: ==--
--
--
--
I ~ ________ ~ __________ ~ __________ ~ __________ ~ 
1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Source: CAB 
FIG UR E 3.2 A I R LIN E SY S T EMS TAT 1ST Ie S 
6 
-70-
5 
4 
3 
2 
1.5 
GNP 
Index 
/ 
./\ 
I \ 
I \ 
I \ 
I 
.-., ///\ 
/ v Ability -to-
buy Index 
1975 1980 
FIGURE 3.3 ABILITY -TO-BUY INDEX (AND 
COMPONENTS) 
10 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1.0 
.7 
.6 
.5 
.4 
.3 
.2 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
-71 -
Quality Index 
Comfort 
(seats/aircraft) _----
. ~ -
L 
,..-
/,--"" 
--
Conven ience 
(aircraft miles) 
.1 ~ ______ L-~ _____________ -L _____________ ~ __________ L--
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
FIGURE 3.4 QUALITY INDEX (AND COMPONENTS) 
)( 
Q) 
"'0 
C 
0- 1.4 
-2 
<.!) 
~ 
0.8 0.9 1.0 
0.8 
)( 
Q) 0.9 
"'0 1.0 
-= -I.I 
>- 1.2 
-
o 
:J 
o 
1.4 
1.2 \.4 
Buying Index 
1.6 1.8 2.0 
....... 
-c: 
o 0.6·-
o 
N 
.80 .. 
~ 
0-
0:: 
o 1.0 Q) 
en 
I. I 
1.4 
-
~ 
a.. 
a:: 
FIGURE 3.5 EFFECT OF GNP, YIELD, AND QUA~IT Y ON 
PASSENGER TRAFFIC , 
-..... 
-7)-
100 
95 
90 
85 
I 
80 I 
I 
en I 
~ 75 r .... -J 
c:: I Q) 
u 70 1 / ( 
65 I I 
I 
\ I' " J Cost 55 
" \ 'r-.../I \ 
50 \ , 
/-.1 
" 45 '--'" 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Source: CAB 
FIGURE 3.6 REVENUE AND COST PER TON MILE 
(DOMESTIC SERVICE) (CURRENT $) 
-74-
100 
90 
80 Labor 
0/0 50 Fuel 
40 Capi to I 
30 
Other 
20 Includes 
Trafti c Commission s 5 % 
10 Meals 3% 
Advertising 2% 
68 70 75 80 
Source:ATA 
FIGURE 3.7 PERCENT OF CASH 
OPERATING EXPENSES 
(TRUNKS AND LOCALS) 
40 
-a 35 
a. 
m 
S 30 
en 
-~ 
~ 25 
x 
w 
u 20 
l1J 
a. 
o 15 
Q) 
~ o /0 
m 
""'-
E:R 5 
-75-
1960 65 
Source: Brown (1981) 
70 
Of f i cial 
Price 
r-L.._ 
I 
I 
r.1 
I 
....--_r-- I 
---,----__ J t 
Inflation t Iran- Iraq War 
Adjus ted Iron Revolution 
(l972S) 
75 80 85 
Oil Embargo 
FIGURE 3.8 OFFICIAL PR ICE OF SAUDI LIGHT CRUDE 
OIL AND OPEC EXPORTS ($/BARREL) 
(42 US GALLONS = I BARREL) 
-76-
Non-Communist world oi I 
production (yearly averages 
in millions of barrels a .~~~--'r-"~~ 
day), by major producing 
groups 
~ United States 
D Other Non -Communist Cou n t r i e s r--r--r-,'r-T-7'T-.7'Y---rY~~ 
f22jOpec 
160 
165 
170 
1 75 
30 20 10 o 10 20 
Source: New York Times (1982) 
FIGURE 3.9 THE SHIFTING PATTERN OF 
WORLD OIL PRODUCTION 
..Q 
, 
"-
- ..c Q), 
:J..Q lL-
.9 
.8 
-77-
\;
ertl fied Turbojets 
Certi fied low Bypass 
Tur botons 
.~.2 . 7 TechnolocJY Trend 
.... - Certified High Bypass 
.- c.. Turbofans ~ § . 6 Derivative Turbofans 
c.. (/) E30bjective't 
en 8 5 ~ ____ L....-_"-_"-_"--"'"'""-_-" 
i950 60 70 80 90 2000 
Source: Aviation Week and Space 
Technology (1982) 
* E3=Energy Efficient Engine 
FIGURE 3.10 LARGE US COMMERCIAL 
TRANSPORT FUEL 
CONSUMPTION 
-78-
16 
14 
12 
10 
8 
6 
Trunks LTD Rate 
4 
2 
1950 1960 1970 1980 
Source: Rolls - Royce (1981) 
FIGURE 3.11 US INTEREST RATES 
U) 
Q) 
0'1 
c: 
0 
L: 
0 
-c: Q) 
0 
~ 
Q) 
a. 
0 
~ 
c: 
c: 
<! 
10 
8 
-6 C\l I"-
4 ()) 
2 ~ 
....... 
0 a.. Z 
-2 (!) 
-4 
jU Q) 
20 0'1 
10 
f/)e 
Q)Q) 
0 
c: > 
o<! 
'""")-
0 
-10 ~ ';: 
-
-20 
-30 
Of/) 
o~ 
-c 
c: 
45-48149-52 53 -56157 -60 61 -64165 -68 69 -72173 -76 77-80 81-
TRUMAN EISENHOWER KENNEDY- NIXON - CARTER REAGAN 
JOHNSON (63) FORD (74) 
FIGURE 3.12 PRESIDENTIAL TERMS, GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 
AND STOCK· PRICES 
I 
--.J 
U> 
I 
40 
30 
20 
10 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
2 
-80-
4% 
I~~~ ____ ~ __ ~ ____ -L ____ ~ __ ~ ____ ~ ____ L-
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990' 1995 2000 
FIGURE 3.13 GNP AND RPM GROWTH 
-81-
Table 3.1 
DOMESTIC AIRLINE REVENUE, COST AND PROFIT PER REVENUE TON MILE 
(cents per mi Ie) 
Current $ 1972 $ (I mp 1 i cit Price Deflator GNP) 
Year Revenue Cost Profit Revenue Cost 
1960 58.35 57.35 1.00 84.9 83.5 
1 59. 11 59.17 (0.06) 85.3 85.35 
2 58.29 56.03 2.26 82.6 79.4 
3 57.75 54.77 2.98 80.6 76.4 
4 56.58 50.87 5.71 77 .8 69.9 
1965 54.48 47.81 6.67 73.3 64.3 
6 51.79 45.57 6.22 67.5 59.4 
7 49.90 45.67 4.23 63.1 57.8 
8 49.86 47.00 2.66 60.4 56.9 
9 49.74 47.43 2.31 57.3 54.6 
1970 51.74 51. 75 (0.01) 56.6 56.6 . 
1 54.76 53.03 1. 73 57.0 55.2 
2 55.51 52.35 3. 17 55.5 52.4 
3 58.02 55.07 2.95 54.9 52. 1 
4 72.65 67.70 4.95 63.2 60.7 
1975 70.42 69.73 0.69 56.1 55.5 
6 78.90 75.63 3.27 59.7 57.2 
7 78.06 74.82 3.24 55.8 53.5 
8 78.53 74.10 4.43 52.3 49.4 
9 84.26 83.76 0.50 51.8 51.4 
1980 109.75 109.75 61.8 61.8 
SOURCE: ATA Annual Reports 
60 63 65 68 
Ga lIons of 
Jet Fuel 
(109) .988 2.34 3.37 6.45 
RPM (109) 
(Domestic) 30.6 38.5 51.9 87.5 
RPM/Ga lIon 30.9 16.5 15.4 13.6 
(/ga lIon 
(current $) 10 10 10 10 
(/gallon 
(1972 $) 15 14 13 12 
Table 3.2 
FUEL CONSUMPTION AND PRICE (DOMESTIC) 
YEAR 
70 72 73 74 75 76 
7.78 7.89 8.24 7.42 7.56 7.91 
104.1 118. 1 126.3 129.7 131 .7 1~5.3 
13.4 15.0 15.3 17.5 17.4 18.4 
11 12 15 25 30 32 
12 12 14 22 24 2~ 
78 79 
8.62 '9.32 
187.8 208.6 
21.8 22.4 
40 58 
26 36 
80 
.. , 
95 
54 
I 
0: 
N 
I 
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3.3 General Aviation 
Just as in the airline industry, general aviation also has benefited 
from technological improvements to aircraft. These qualitative improvements, 
which have come about at relatively little cost, have in turn led to 
increased purchases of larger aircraft with more sophisticated avionic 
packages. Although the price of the average aircraft rose from 
$28,000 to $67,500 (1972) from 1960 to 1979, this was quite in line with 
the rise in real GNP ($737 to $1,483 b) (Table 2.5). Consequently GA has 
made more use of the ATC system. Sixty percent of the fleet is now capable 
of IFR flights. 
This trend of purchasing larger aircraft is expected to continue. 
, 
Estimates for the various GA aircraft types to the year 2000 are shown in 
Table 3.3. These projections assume, as in the airline sector, that 
the economy will continue to expand; that congestion problems will not 
become much more severe (i .e., that GA aircraft will continue to access large 
hubs, albeit at non-peak hours) j that the price and availability of fuel will 
not become a constraint. A further assumption is that the production capacity 
of GA aircraft manufacturers can be maintained at 15,000 aircraft per year, 
at which rate three-quarters of the year 2000's fleet will consist of aircraft 
built after 1980. Since almost all of the current GA aircraft have been 
built since 1960, this production rate assumes that replacement will be 
necessary of only half of the current fleet by 2000. The best estimate is 
a GA fleet of 430,000 aircraft. 
By estimating the yearly utilization of these various types of aircraft, 
the total number of annual hours can be derived and then broken down into 
itinerant and local hours. By estimating the duration of a typical itinerant 
and local flight, the total number of flights is obtained by dividi~g the 
-84~ 
number of hours by the duration of the fl ights. To obtain the number of 
operations, it is estimated that a typical local flight consists of six 
operations (3 take-offs and 3 landings), while an itinerant flight by 
definition consists of 2 operations. Thus the total number of operations 
is obtained by summing the local and itinerant operations. Finally, 
by estimating the percentage of all operations which are made at towered 
facilities, the total number of tower operations is obtained. This process 
is shown in Table 3.4. The results are shown in Figure 3.14. 
The estimate of a 3.5% average annual growth rate for the GA 
fleet is lower than the historic trend (1960-1980) of 5%, indicating 
that general aviation is approaching maturity as well. 
Table 3.3 .( 
GROWTH OF ACTIVE GENERAL AVIATION FLEET BY AIRCRAFT TYPE TO THE YEAR 2000 
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT (000) 
Compound . Bes t Es t imate Annual 
Ai rcraft Growth Extrapolated Percent Total 
Type 1973 1979 Rate in % to Year 2000 Growth Aircraft 
FIXED WING 
l-engine piston 51 62 3.3 124 2 90 
1-3 seats 
l-engine piston 75 106 6.0 354 2 160 
4+ seats 
2-engine piston 13 17 3.9 38 4 35 I co 
1-6 seats V1 I 
2-engine piston 5 8 7.9 39 6 25 
7+ seats 
2-engine turboprop 3 15 55 10 20 
1-12 seats 
2-engine turboprop 0.5 0.5 1.0 5 
13+ seats 
2-engine turbojet 1.2 2.3 11.6 23 10 28 
Other turbojet 0.2 0.3 10.9 3 6 
ROTORCRAFT 
Piston 2 3 6.7 12 6 10 
Turbine 3 18.4 93 11 25 
OTHER 2 5 13.8 72 10 35 
TOTAL AIRCRAFT 153 2]0 5.4 814 430 
A· ft Projected 
No. (loj) 
Single 
Engine. 250 Piston 
Multiengine. 
Piston 60 
Turbine 
(Prop & 50 jet) 
Other 70 
TOTALS 430 
Annual 
Growth 
Rate 3.5% 
Table 3.lj 
GA Forecast\ng Matrix (Year 2000) 
Average Total 
H Uti Ilzatlon (lOb) 
200 50 
280 17 
500 13 
300 20 
250 100 
1% 4% 
6 Total Hrs (10 ) 
I tin. t Loca 1 
70% 30% 
35 15 
90% 10% 
15 2 
95% 5% 
12 1 
80% 20% 
16 4 
78 22 
Fl1ghts (1'06) 
fiFlioht (Hr) 
It in. Local 
1.0 0.8 
35 19 
1.3 0.6 
12 3 
1.2 0.7 
10 1 
0.7 0.5 
20 8 
77 31 
Operations (106) Total Ops at 
Oo/Flioht ODS T 
It in. Local (lOb) 
2 6 20% 
70 110 180 35 
2 6 30% 
24 20 44 15 
2 6 60% 
20 6 26 15 
2 6 10% 
40 48 88 10 
154 184, 338 75 
2% 
- - ----- --- -- --------
I 
00 
0' 
1000 
800 
600 
500 
300 
200 
60 
50 
30 
20 
Annual Utilizati·on 
1960 = 170 Hrs 
I 980 = 208 H r s 
2000 = 250 Hrs 
Hours Flown 
( x 105 ) 
Active GA 
Aircraft 
Fleet 
(000) 
/' 
. /~// 
/./ ./ 
.//",.. / 
.//'" / // ../ /~-r / /~, / 
~ Best / /' ~. EsUmate// // 
/ ",'" / ./ /" 
/ ./ /" 
//,/~"'~Best 
~/?/ Estimate ~v \Historic Trend . 1960-80 Projection (5°1o) 
1973-79 
AIC Type 
Projection 
Cumulative Domestic 
Shipments (000) 
[S ince 1960] 
10~ __ ~ ____ ~ ____ -L ____ ~ ____ ~ ____ L-____ ~ __ -J ____ 
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000' 
FIGURE 3.14 GA ACTIVITY 
-88-
3.4 The Ai rports and the ATC System 
The concept of "better lucky than smart ll appUes to the forecaster 
as well as to the lottery player -- perhaps even more so. Thus the fortuitous 
development and publication of the FAA's IINational Ai rspace System Plan" 
in early 1982, which details the step-by-step development of the ATC system 
that the FAA intends to undertake to the year 2000, makes the forecast 
for this area seemingly as simple as copying appropriate pages of the 
report and including them in this section. Table 3.5 provides an 
overview of expected developments. 
To be sure,some complaints about the plan have come in, but in general 
it is supported by all segments of the aviation community (Simpson, 1982). 
General aviation, as usual, complains about the implied user equipment 
costs to operate in the system. The Airline Pilots Association's (ALPA) 
favorite technological solution to ATC, the CDTI (Cockpit Display of Traffic 
Information), is given short shrift as Administrator Helms feels the FAA 
cannot share ATC responsibility with pilots in this century. The major 
attacks on the program have come on the FAA's treatment of airport capacity. 
Although there are capacity improvements, such as MLS, advanced metering and 
spacing of arrivals, and wake vortex detection systems, the FAA projects 
congestion to continue (Table 3.6). The Plan notes that: 
... it is the growth in major metropolitan areas ..• which causes 
special concern. These areas contain the largest concentration 
of aviation industry consumers, representing 90 percent of the 
air carrier enplanements and 40 percent of itinerant aircraft 
operat ions (i n 1981 fi gures). They al so represent areas in 
which growth is most difficult. Because of their high population 
density, increasing resistance to the adverse environmental 
impact of airport growth, and the expensive and difficult task 
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of land acquisition for the enlargement of existing facilities 
or construction of new airports, expansion in these areas is 
nearly impossible. Additionally, citizens in many metropolitan 
areas are pressing to limit, not expand, aircraft operations. 
Strained commercial airport capacity and constricted growth 
translate into system congestion ... (at) those airports which already 
are or will experience severe airside congestion ... during peak 
hours, aircraft are expected to encounter average delays of 30 minutes 
per operation. Some congestion will be relieved through developments 
in airport design, reductions in aircraft separation standards, improvements 
in landing aids and use of advanced STOl aircraft. However, these 
alone will not provide the capacity for expansion which is needed 
to meet future aviation demands at these locations. It may therefore 
become necessary to impose quotas and flow control restrictions at 
the affected airports. This will result in schedule changes for 
alleviating peak hour congestion, flights being shifted to alternate 
airports, and some flights being cancelled altogether .... 
A fairly bleak picture, all after an estimated expenditure of $1 bill ion per 
year to the year 2000 to put the plan into place. However, there may be a more 
cheerful resolution. The FAA's gloomy view of congestion is predicated upon its 
demand forecasts which envision much more airline industry activity than is deemed 
possible in this analysis. A smaller (25%) set of estimates based on the work of 
the preceding chapters is shown in Figure 3.15. Thus the FAA, too, may be more 
lucky t~an smart, and with the aid of non-capital techniques (Table 3.7), the 
airlines and general aviation may have far better service than that indicated 
in Table 3.6. tt is imperative, however, that the FAA's plan, or something similar 
to it, be implemented for the aviation system to remain viable in the year 2000. 
Table 3.5: ATC System Utilizatiqll -90-
NAVIGATION 
VOR/VORTAC 
SATELLI TE NAV 
DI1E 
INS 
LORAN C 
OI1EGAlVLF 
DOPPLER 
NOB 
RNAV 
40 RNAV 
MAPPING (an enroute map display) 
COMMUNICATION & DATA LINK 
VHF COMM 
UHF COMM 
HF COMM 
MODE S 
ACARS 
SATELLITE 
VHF WEATHER DATA BROADCAST (VOR) 
HF DATA LINK 
AIRCRAFT SEPARATION 
EFR (Electronic Flight Rules) 
TCAS II 
TCAS I 
AT AS (TERMINAL) (Automated Terminal 
Advisory Service) 
CDTI (Cockpit Display of Traffic Information) 
ALTIMETRY 
1981 
w 
W 
L 
l 
L 
L 
W 
W 
L 
W 
W 
W 
W 
ATCRBS W 
MODE S 
FMS (Flight Management Systems) L 
LANDING SYSTEMS 
MLS 
IU W 
ADF W 
VOR W 
RNAV l 
CAT lilA L 
CAT liB 
HUO (Head Up Display) 
ADVANCED HOD (New generation CRT displays) 
ElEC. APPR. PLATE (Electronic stored and 
displayed approach plates) 
LEGEND: L-LIMITED USE 
I-INCREASING USE 
'.I-WIDESPREAD USE 
D-DECREASING USE 
1985 
'.I 
W 
I 
L 
L 
e 
W 
W 
L 
I 
w 
w 
W 
L 
L 
w 
W 
W 
W 
L 
I 
I-
L 
l 
1990 2000 
'.I 
l 
W 
I 
L 
L 
o 
W 
W 
w 
'vi 
W 
W 
W 
L 
W 
L 
\l 
L 
W 
L 
L 
L 
L 
o 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
I 
W 
'.I 
I 
L 
'.I 
L 
W 
W 
L 
L 
o 
W 
W 
W 
w 
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E 
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I 
W 
W 
L 
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I 
I 
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o 
W 
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w 
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o 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
W 
Table 3.6 
AIRPORTS WITH SEVERE AIRSIDE CONGESTION 
YEAR AIR CARRIER COMMUTER RELI EVER GENERAL AVIATION 
1981 8 3 . 
1985 10 1 7 
1990 23 5 11 2 
2000 46 9 29 7 
SOURCE: National Airspace System Plan (1981) 
TOTAL 
11 
18 
41 
91 
---_._-----
I 
I 
I 
\.D 
Table 3.7 
NON-CAPITAL ALTERNATIVES FOR REDUCING CONGESTION 
GENERAL APPROACH 
Re dis t rib uti on 
of activity 
by time 
Redistribution 
of acti vi ty 
by area 
Reduce ove ra 11 
activity level 
SPECIFIC APPROACH 
Transfer between 
hours 
Transfer between 
airports 
Reduce frequency 
Change aircraft mix 
Change network 
SOURCE: Peat .Marw i ck & M i tche 11 (1979) 
TYPE OF ALTERNATIVE 
PRICE 
Time differentiated fares 
Peak period activity fee 
Fare differentiation by 
at rport wi th rebate at 
non-congested hub airports 
Peak pe ri od act i vi ty fee 
Fue 1 tax 
Peak period activity fee 
All of the above have the 
potential to modify the 
network structure 
NON-PRICE 
Quotas on aircraft operations 
Quotas on aircraft operations 
Perimeter rule 
Aircraft type restrictions 
Quotas on aircraft operation~ 
Perimeter rule 
Aircraft type restri~tion~ 
Capaci ty 1 Iml tatton agreelJlents 
Quotas on aircraft operat!ons 
Peri me ter ru le 
Aircraft type restrictions 
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3.5 Technology Forecasts 
Technological forecasting is generally defined as the forecasting 
of technological change. It can be divided conveniently into invention (the 
creation of a new product or process), innovation (the first introduction 
of that product or process into use), and diffusion (the spread of that 
product or process beyond the first use) (Schon, 1965). 
Technological forecasting is an arcane enough branch of futurology 
(also called futuristics or futurism) and a cottage industry large enough to have 
started its own journal. However, the journal was quickly coopted by social 
scientists {Technological Forecasting (1969-1970); Technological Forecasting 
and Social Change {1970-1982)1 
Futurology itself is hardly a cottage industry but a thriving field 
with its own monthly (The Futurist), association. (\~or1d Future Society), and 
conventions (General Assembly of the World Future Society). In a primer on 
futurology, Cornish (1977) provides a bibliography of over a hundred future-
oriented books (and a reference to a longer listing), ranging from the simplistic 
(Bright, J.R. A Brief Introduction to Technology Forecasting Concepts and 
Exercises, 1972) to the far out (Arthur C. Clarke's Imperial Earth, a 
science-fiction novel about the U.S. in 2276); also included are the better 
known works by Herman Kahn (i.e., The Year 2000) and Alvin Toffler (i.e., 
Future Shock). At one extreme of futurology, all works of science-fiction can 
be included, although futurists tend to fancy themselves more portentously 
and liken their work to research produced by the more commonly accepted physical 
(or even social) scientists. 
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In the very first issue of Technological Forecasting (June, 1969), 
Bouladon considered the question of "Aviation's Role in Future Transportation" 
up to the year 2000. While noting that "technological forecasting is an art 
and not a science," he advanced a number of techniques of the field. One 
is the theory of technical development cycles (10 years for aviation)·T he 
envelope curve method combined with the pilot phenomenon (correlation with 
speeds of military aircraft which shows a 20-year lag for commercial aircraft) 
indicated that speeds in excess of Mach 12 would have little commercial value. 
By next considering the "transport function" (an envelope of all transportation 
speed curves) and extrapolating it to the year 2000,Bouladon foresaw not only 
the need for a supersonic (Mach 2), but also a hypersonic (Mach 6) aircraft. 
The transport function also identified a need for a V/STOL aircraft (or a 
compound rigid rotor helicopter) for distances between 50 and 250 miles. 
Aviation technology saw no limits in 1968, except human; worth noting are 
Bouladon's concluding remarks: 
Thus, the future of aviation seems bright, but there is one condition: 
it must be realized that its 1 imitations are human and not technical. 
Administrators must tackle the difficult problem of airports with 
imagination and courage, and scientists must try to introduce their 
techniques into human life in such a way as to respect manls nature 
and environment. 
In the last resort, it is the way the problems of safety, noise, 
pollution, and pilot training, among other factors, are handled 
that will determine whether this brilliant potential future actually 
comes about. 
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With the death of the U.S. SST in Congress in March, 1971, technological 
virtuosity in itself no longer justified a production line. in aviation. The 
old transport function had become inoperable and airlines could no longer 
count on improved quality of air service (by virtue of higher speed) to attract 
customers. But technological optimists have not totally given up on the SST 
(or even the hypersonic transport (HST», and engineers (mostly at NASA) are 
continuing research on aerodynamics with hopes of minimizing, if not 
eliminating, the sonic boom. While most of the technology for a second 
generation Mach 3 SST seems in place, with the variable cycle engine in 
particular showing high promise for fuel efficiency, the sonic boom problem 
effectively limits the SST to over water operations and thus curtails the 
marketability of the aircraft. American manufacturers, while maintaining 
skeleton design teams for supersonic aircraft, see the remaining decades of 
this century in subsonic terms (Steiner, 1977). Yet deep inside these 
companies some SST moles remain (Schairer, 1976). 
Of more immediate concern to the U.S. manufacturers (and Airbus 
Industrie) is the glut of available airline seats in the US which has come 
about as a result of decl ining {even reversing} traffic,whereas the airline 
fleet plans had been based on ever expanding growth. This excess capacity, 
(calculated as the equivalent of 315 175-seat aircraft) has caused cessation 
and cancellation of new aircraft orders and options (Merrill Lynch, 1982). 
Boeing, Douglas and Lockheed have been in this situation before in the early 
1970's when misplaced exuberance of the airlines in the late 1960's led them 
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to order and the manufacturers to build too many airplanes of the wrong size 
(Newhouse, 1982). It is estimated that there are currently some 200 used 
widebodies for sale (as well as the entire Braniff fleet, of course). 
The pattern of surplus seats and dwindling orders at the beginning 
of each decade of the jet age seems to have become permanent. How many 
more times the airframe (and engine) manufacturers will continue to bet 
their companies on new aircraft (and engines), rather than build derivatives 
of old types, is a question that will become harder and harder to answer. 
General Dynamics (Convair) got out of the game after the 880 and 990 fiascos. 
Lockheed has just abandoned the L-IOII -- to cheers from Wall Street. O~ly 
the DC-9 has any orders left at Douglas. Boeing has seen millions of dollars 
worth of cancellations and delays of orders and options of the 757 and 767 
come in from American and United Airlines. Only Delta is holding firm~ 
As fuel prices have stabil ized, fuel efficiency, the major advantage of the 
new airplanes, has become less of an issue than plain survival of· the airlines. 
Boeing, which currently makes six of every ten commercial aircraft in the 
world, should survive its latest crisis,having learned some lessons from 
the 1969-1971 period when employment had to be cut from 101,000 to 37,500 
(although it, now has the Airbus A300 and A310 to contend with). After the 
near term problems of decl ining traffic have resolved themselves, i.e., the 
economy improves, which it will sooner (maybe this year) or later (7), orders 
for airplanes will come in. Timing may be crucial, however. Even though 
Boeing is estimating that 40% of the total world-wide commercial fleets will 
need replacement before 1992 (worth $126 billion) (Aviation Daily,12/81), it 
can be postponed~ Many airlines may retain a substantial number of standard-body 
twin and trijet aircraft into the 1990's. only when an airplane is.economically., 
obsolete '(it ~an no longer generate ~ po~itive cash flow) must it be replaced 
(Munson, 1982). Certainly Boeing and Airbus Industrie will be building 
large jet transport aircraft into the rest of the 1900's (Table 3.8). 
At the lower end of the market, second generation small turboprop afrcraft 
are beginning to arrive to serve the commuter (now called regional) industry 
to supplement (and replace) the DeHavilland of Canada Twin Otters (1966 vintage) 
and Beech 99's (1968), which have been the mainstay of the upper end of the 
industry up to now. (The lower end will continue to be served by the 1 ikes 
of the Piper Chieftain and the Cessna 402.) The unregulated commuters, which 
had been limited t~ aircraft of less then 30 seats prior to the Deregulation 
Act, can now fly aircraft of up to 60 seats, and manufacturers are ru~hing In 
to fill the void between 30 and 60 seats. At least seven new turboprop aircraft 
are being offered. Only one of the manufacturers is strictly American, and it is 
also the one that is least likely to succeed (the four engine CAC-lOO). The 
others are: (1) French-Ital ian AT;R 42; (2) Spanish-Indonesian CN-235; 
(3) Swedish-US SF-340; (4) Canadian DHC-8; (5) Brazilian Brasilia; (6) Northern 
Irish Shorts 360. It is hard to see how all these lines can be successful. 
All these new aircraft. small and large, h~ve lower operating costs due 
to technological advances of the past twenty years. These advances will 
continue. Noted earlier were expected engine improvements which will cut 
fuel consumption (Figure 3.10). Additional improvements are expected .in 
aerodynamics, structures, systems, and flight management. Active controls. 
are already in airline use on the L-I011; more will be employed. (Active 
control technology combines sensors and computerized electronics to reduce 
structural loading and to impart artificial stability; consequently the 
si.ze of the horizontal tail can be reduced.) In structures. m~re. use wJl.1 
be made of advanced composites which will lead. to significant weight redu~tions. 
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All-electric systems technology will continue to develop and make 
fly-by-wire airplanes possible during the 1990's. The elimination of cables 
and hydraulic systems will lead to significant redesign of the cockpit and 
reduction of pilot workload. Finally, if laminar flow control can be achieved 
fuel savings of 25% to 30% will be realized (Steiner, 1980). 
Aside from changes in commercial transport aircraft, other technological 
developments will take place in the aviation system. A prop-fan aircraft 
in commercial use for short-medium ranges holds out the promise of significant 
fuel savIngs, 8% to 15% compared to equIvalent technology turbofans (Gatzen 
and Adamson, 1981). Problems with the gearbox, propeller, and installation 
, 
aspects (noise and vibration) remain; airline acceptability is yet another 
question (Fairless, 1980). In the short-haul area rotorcraft have long been 
considered as the answer to airport congestion, yet implementation of commercial 
service has been notable for failures (in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Los 
Angeles). With the technology of advanced helicopters and tilt-rotors, this 
long-held promise may yet be fulfIlled (Williams, 1980). In the STOL area, aside 
from the DeHavilland of Canada Dash 7, transports using augmented lift may appear. 
Although the technology to build very large (super large) aircraft exists today, 
there appears to be little demand for them, either in passenger or cargo 
configurations. Studies of very large aircr.aft,with or without nuclear propulsion~ 
will continue (Layton, 1979). Other advanced concepts, such as the 
Aerial Relay System (Kyser, 1979), will also be left for the next century. 
Only a sickly economy stands in the way of increased use of 
business jets. There are now more private jet planes in the US than commercial 
transport aircraft. US companies (more than half of the top 1,000 
corporations) operate one or more aircraft, and thi·s trend is expected to 
continue, with jets expected to have one of the highest growth rate in the GA 
fleet (Table 3.lt) ("Torch up the Learjet!") 
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The use-of the business jet is not the only potential constraint on 
business travel on the domestic airlines. There will also be technological 
improvements in telecommunications. The growth of cable television will 
continue, with two-way communication (videotex and teletext) becoming more 
prevalent; 40% of American households are projected to have two-way videotex 
service to the end of the century (Institute of the Future, 1982). People 
will become glued to the TV, -- information fanatics. However, It Is the growth 
in teleconferencing that may be more important for the travel industry. 
Although closed circuit television has been around for years, the proliferation 
of communication satellites in the last five years has made multi-city,audio-video 
hook-ups cheaper and easier. Hospitals, colleges and hotel chains are equipping 
themselves with video dish receivers that can be used for cable television 
and teleconferencing. Companies have sprung up that arrange satellite hook-Ups 
for any occasion. Large multinational corporations can hold video conferences 
that tie together their world-wide activities via satellite networks. 
And not to forget Mother Bell -- she wants to replace her old two-way 
Rictureph6ne service, which has been in operation for 15 years, with an 
expanded, more advanced system. When in place in 1983, there will be studios 
in 42 cities. Businessmen in two (or more) of these cities will be able 
to lease these facilities from AT&T and hold meetings over closed-circuit 
color television. Whether all this teleconferencing capability will reduce 
travel or simply enhance communications is not clear (Mitre, 1978). Certainly 
a great deal of intra-company communication can be accomplished via teleconferencing. 
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However, executives have come to regard some travel as a perquisite --
conventions, industry association meetings, and similar junkets will continue 
to attract the travelers anxious to get away from the office for a few days. 
This state of affairs is unlikely to change by the year 2000 (or later). 
Category 
SHORT RANGE 
HEDIUH 
RANGE 
LONG 
RANGE 
FREIGHTER 
SOURCE: Steiner (1980) 
Table 3.S 
JET AIRCRAFT TO THE YEAR 2000 
Current and Committed 
737-200/300 
DC-9-30/80 
747SR 
BAC-1l1 
F-28 
BAE 146 
727-200 
AlOO 
A310 
DC-IO-ID 
L-IOII 
767 
757 
707-320C 
DC-IO-30/40 
747-1001200 
747SP 
L-IOII-500 
DC-S-70 
747F/C 
DC-IOCF 
Possible Additions 
F-29 
757 Derivative 
A 320 
727-RE 
767 Stretch 
DC-1O Derivative 
7-7 
747 Derivative 
A300 Derivative 
DC-IO Derivative 
A300F/C 
767F/C 
!.. 
0 
... 
I 
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4. What Is to be Done: A Summary 
Technological progress in the form of higher productivity aircraft 
accelerated the growth of the aviation system in the United States, abetted 
by favorable economic and demographic changes. Productivity improvements 
led to lower operating costs and fares; the economy cooperated by providing 
more real income. As the quality of air transportation improved simultaneously 
with price reductions, airline passengers multiplied. General aviation 
activities showed similar growth .. 
Whereas the first cycle of the jet age continued the aviation technology 
trends of increased speed at lower seat-mile costs, the second cycle - the 
wide-bodies - no longer moved upward on the speed scale. (The favorable seat-
mile trends continued - no mean feat.) Even as the wide-bodies were being 
introduced, it was still thought that the SST's would soon appear on their 
rightful place on the speed curve and that the slow 747's would be confined 
to freight and charter work. But SST technology ran into economic and 
environmental thickets. While the Concorde flies on, it is one of a kind, 
and not the forerunner of fleets of SST's and HST's. The 757's, 767's and 
A300's are being bought for fuel efficiency, not speed. Nor are the airplanes 
getting larger, although seating densities are increasing - utilization aside, 
is the long productivity improvement game over? 
For long range aircraft, certainly, quantum jumps appear unlikely. While 
technological improvements will be gradually integrated into the new jets 
\ 
(digital avionics, fuel efficient engines, active controls, etc.) the emphasis 
at Boeing, Douglas and Airbus will remain on cost reductions rather than speed 
increases. General aviation and commuter-sized turboprop production aircraft 
will also continue to benefit from technological progress. 
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Still, serendipidity can also playa part in the aerospace industry. 
Laminar flow control, a new shape (IIPepsi - bottle"?), or super-composite 
materials could bring forth new aircraft designs with quantitative (cost) 
and qual itative (speed) gains greatly stimulating personal air travel, as did 
the original jets. Barring revolutionary breakthroughs at airframe and engine 
manufacturers, where should research be concentrated? 
High speed and short haul are the logical answers. Although the SST is 
temporarily sidetracked, a boomless (or near-boomless) SST over land, if 
economically feasible, would have the airlines rushing to place orders (and 
people rushing to fill the seats). These two big ifs, noise and economics, 
should be the main areas of high speed research. Solutions would lead to the 
third cycle in jet technology, or more properly, the long delayed second. 
The other logical candidate for research is short haul travel. Great as 
the airline boom has been, it still has not penetrated the 85% of intercity 
travel done by car. Perhaps it is an impossible task, given the economics 
and the convenience of the personal automobile. Perceived costs amount to 
gasoline purchases; there is no hassle changing modes at either end of the trip 
to reach the ultimate destination (which is hardly ever an airport). Still, 
the promise of rotorcraft or short take-off and landing technology for public 
transportation has largely been unfulfilled. STOL systems (Twin Otter or 
Dash-7 demonstrations in Canada aside) foundered, among other factors, on the 
unavailability of the downtownSTOLport. High operating costs of rotorcraft. 
made them useless for public travel. 
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Even if people want to travel from downtown to downtown, large cities, 
which could support this kind of service, lack the empty spaces required 
for STOL operation; only rotorcraft will suffice. STOL aircraft, however, 
are well suited to offload short haul traffic from the long runways at major 
airports and thus ameliorate the capacity problem. Thus both rotorcraft and 
STOL aircraft are worthy of continued research efforts. 
Basic research in aeronautics must also continue since it is here that 
revolutionary, as well as evolutionary, advances can be made. Nor should 
analyses of different concepts of travel be neglected: often today's far-out 
idea is tomorrow's commonplace. 
-106-
5. Apocalypse Now? 
The aviation system is maturing rapidly, if indeed it is not 
already mature (in the sense of rising and falling with the GNP). 
This is as true in general aviation (although some sectors will remain 
high growth areas) as in the airline industry. But while maturity is 
hardly cause for despair, it will call for greater wisdom in the 
management ranks -- no longer will automatic traffic growth (and the CAB) 
protect the airlines from themselves. The race will go to the swift 
those airlines able to reequip themselves with the technologically 
advanced aircraft of the eighties and nineties and those airl ines which 
structure their networks (and fares) to fit their equipment (and cost 
structures) best. 
This will be true (especially true) if another oil crisis 
occurs: either a second Arab oil embargo or the interruption (cessation) 
of the flow of Saudi Arabian oil. Although oil imports have stabilized 
since 1977, the US is still importing 2,300 mill ions of barrels annually, 
accounting for some 20% of the consumption (80% are OPEC barrels, of 
which 20% is Saudi crude). Only 265 million barrels have been stored 
in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (some 40 days worth of imports). 
Even pessimists agree that another surge in 011 prices is unlikely until 
the world recovers from its current economic malaise (induced in part 
by the first two oil shocks of 1973 and 1979). When (and if) demand'for 
oil increases, and prices should double, a sharp increase in inflation 
will be followed by a severe recession -- businesses would fail and 
unemployment rise -- a not unfamiliar picture. Observers note that the 
Middle East is becoming more unstable -- revolutions, coups, social 
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upheavals, regional wars, possible Soviet expansionism -- and that 
continued US (and world) dependence on that region for oil supplies is 
foolhardy (Yergin, 1982). Should a world energy crisis occur, and 
some postulate this as a possible scenario before the year 2000 (Ayres, 1979), 
aviation will be only one of many sectors that will suffer severely. (It 
will take truly bad luck for the world to blunder into outright cataclysmic 
events a nuclear war, for example these are not considered further.) 
The rise in US airline RPHs to the 300-360 mill.ion range by 2000 
has been postulated on continued economic growth (not year to year, necessarily, 
but cumulatively over the next twenty years) of about 2.5%, compounded 
annually. Traffic growth will be accommodated not by increased.operations 
but by a continued shift to larger aircraft. Although aeronautical engineering 
has progressed to the point where small (130 seat) jet aircraft can be 
operated at the same seat-mile costs as large (400 seat) airc"raft, congestion 
at major airports will lead the maj~r airlines to purchase large aircraft. 
However, the low seat-mile costs of the smaller new technology aircraft 
will also increase direct service by the smaller airlines between smaller 
hubs) relieving pressure at the larger hubs (and relieving the major airlines 
of connecting traffic). GA traffic will continue to use small and large 
hubs (sharing non-duty runways with commuters), although reliever airports 
will also increase. Ground access problems will plague various airports, 
and airport authorities will continue their struggles to solve them. Certainly 
they will not inhibit traffic growth to any measurable degree. 
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Deregulation, a dozen new airlines, recessions, falling traffic, 
suicidal fare wars, the ATC controllers' strike plus mass firings and 
reregulation by the FAA via the slot assignment route, loss of faith by 
the travel agents, and, above all, poor management, led to Braniff's 
bankruptcy. By the year 2000, will others join? 
In any analysis of the airline industry it is important to 
remember that not all airlines are created equal. The big airlines are 
really large. In domestic operations in 1981, American flew 26 billion 
RPMs; Delta 23; Eastern 24; Pan Am 8 (29 including international operations); 
TWA 16 (26 including international) and United 34. (All of these airlines 
also had operating revenues of over $3 billion). In domestic operations 
the old trunks (the above plus Braniff, Continental, Northwest and Western) 
generated 160 billion RPMs while the old locals (Frontier, Ozark, Piedmont, 
Republ ic [i .e., ~orth Central plus Southern plus Hughes Ai rwest], Texas 
International, and US Air [old Allegheny]) flew 24 bill ion rpms. Thus 
any of the top five trunks flew more RPMs than all the locals. 
However, since deregulation the trunks' share of the total US 
market has decl ined from 88% in 1978 to 81% in 1981. Their own RPMs have 
been slipping (164 billion in 1978 versus 160 billion in 1981) while the 
old locals' have been rising (16 billion 1978; 24 billion in 1981). Also 
rising has been traffic on old intrastate and commuter airlines, as well 
as new entrants. New entrants are mere gnats in the airline aviary 
combined they managed to fly 1.4 billion RPMs in 1981. Talk of the new 
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entrants bringing down an established carrier is somewhat premature. 
Braniff's (6.3 billion domestic RPMs, 8.8 total) demise was not caused by 
its long feud with Southwest (2.3 bill ion RPMs) -- only when it tried to 
undercut American, which had established a rival hub at Dallas, did its 
troubles magnify. 
However, RPMs, or even operating revenues, are but one part 
of the picture. To keep flying, the airlines must at least break even; 
to expand or to reequip obsolescent fleets they must make a profit. 
The operating margin, the difference between passenger yield and cost 
per available seat mile, reflects how well management runs its operations. 
Any non-operating expenses, such as interest expense and debt load, will 
further reduce the overall profit. Although Braniff's yield/cost spread 
was approximately in the middle of US airlines (3.34 cents), non-operating 
expenses expedited its collapse. 
Managements can increase the spread by increasing yield (fares), 
or at least not decrease it through ineffective discount fares or predatory 
fare wars. However, competition can always appear on one's routes. More 
likely to be affected by management action is the cost side of the spread 
equation. It will be even more important in the future after all price 
controls will be abandoned by the CAB after the end of 1982. In any future 
head-on competition, the low-cost carriers will have the advantage. That 
is why the large carriers feel so threatened by the pygmies, the new entrants. 
As noted earlier, labor is the easiest (the only, sometimes) cost factor for 
managements to control and will remain so in the future. How labor responds 
will determine the future of the industry. 
· . .., 
Three scenarios of the airlin~ industry can be cpnstdered for 
the ye~r 2000. They cov~r a range of po~sibilrtie~, but obviously are 
not an exhaustive set. Even if none are likely to come about in their 
entirety some elements of each scenario can be considered as strong pro-) 
babilities. An assumption common to all scenarios is that deregulation 
will continue at the entry and exit level, i.e., franchises 
will no longer be handed out (or sold) for routes by the CAB (or its 
successor agency). A return to some minimal fare regulation is permissible 
under these scenarios, with fares possibly differentiated by equipment 
type as well as quality of service (first class, business class, economy class, 
cattie-car class), but basically fare distinctions will also prevail. 
Some type of essential air service (possibly under another name) 
will be provided by small airlines to small communities. Subsidy payments 
by the federal government will continue to underwrite these flights which 
will use small (less than 60 seat) propeller-driven aircraft. 
Under Scenario A (Table 5.1) a continuation of present trends 
is expected. Growth of the old local airlines (the second tier) continues 
as they take over more of the short-haul (under 1,000 mile)markets from 
the trunksi continued profits allow them to acqufre new aIrcraft when 
needed. Some trunks purposefully reduce their size: una~le to purchase 
efficient new aircraft, they shed routes as planes become obsolescent.· 
After another major carrier (the Lorenzo conglomerate of Continental, 
Texas Int'l and NY Air) goes urider,labor continues to concede in wage' 
and productivity .negotlations at larger, high-cost airlines,anowing them'; .... 
to stay in business. However, the specialized third-tier t~rriers conttriu~ 
to have cost-advantagest especially as new ones are created. These new 
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entrants continue serving short-medium haul markets of medium traffic 
density. Some third-tier carriers move up into the second tier after 
expansion. Mergers subside after TWA and Northwest combine to provide 
better feed to a rational ized international network. Commuters feed 
the first and second tiers. 
Scenario B (Table 5.2) continues where scenario A leaves off. 
As traffic growth resumes, all airlines are making profits and labor demands 
its share. Managements, having barely survived the lean years, balk and 
insist on conserving profits to reequip their fleets .. Strikes and slowdowns 
hit major and minor airlines alike. Some (Eastern, Republic, Western) do 
not survive because labor and management are obstinate. After labor protective 
provisions for airlines are eliminated in Congress,U.S. Air and Ozark 
merge to create a two-hub (Pittsburgh, St. Louis) middle-America airl ine. 
A bill passes Congress granting anti-trust immunity to U.S. international 
airlines as Pan Am and TWA/N\~A merge to create American World 
Airways, lithe chosen instrument". 
Scenario C (Table 5.3) takes scenario B one step further. Tired 
of los1~g market share to the second tier, the remaining large airlines 
coopt their local regional airl ines to provide themselves with better feed 
out of their major hubs. 
and one international. 
Four mega-airlines in the US emerge: three domestic 
American/Southwest controls the southwest from Dallas; 
United/Frontier the middle and west from Chicago and Denver; and Delta/Piedmont 
the east from Atlanta. The international airline, American World Airways, 
acquires US Air to serve as an internal feeder, carrying the Allegheny 
commuter idea to its logical conclusion. These large, capital-rich airlines 
do not to~erate competition on their routes as they undersell the small 
third-tier airlines and force them to disband. Some regional airlines 
(i.e., Air Wisconsin) survive to serve those medium-sized points which the 
mega-airlines cannot economically ?erve due to equipment limitations (the 
-112-
737-)00 is the smallest aircraft in their fleets). The commuters, under 
whatever name. continue to exist. 
While scenarios are interesting. twenty years is a long time. Even 
broad trends upon which they are based can be reversed -- a large amount of 
uncertainty always masks the future. However, there appears to be nothing 
inherent in the aviation system that will stop the projected growth, 
although it may be choppy at times. All potentially retarding elements 
come from outsid~ the system. Should they come into play, much more than 
aviation will suffer. The economy of the United States and its aviation 
sys tern will rise and fa 11 in tandem. 
As Ira, the resident first-grade philosopher in the Miss Peach comic 
stri p, observed many years ago: IIAnd suppose if once I become mature, I 
find. donlt like it •• ? --Therels no turning back, is there?1I 
TI ER 
1ST TIER 
(Super-
Markets) 
2ND TIER 
(Large 
neighborhood 
Stores) 
3RD TIER 
(Discount 
Houses and 
Boutiques) 
4TH TIER 
(Ma-and-
Pa Stores) 
SURVIVORS 
Ameri can 
Delta 
Eastern 
Pan Am 
United 
Frontier 
Ozark 
Piedmont 
Repub 1 i c 
Southwest 
US Ai r 
~/es te rn 
Table5.l 
SCENARIO A: LABOR PEACE 
MERGERS 
TWA/Northwest 
DISBANDED/BROKE 
Braniff 
Continental 
New York Air 
Texas International 
20-30 (with intermittent changes in name): Midway, People 
Express, New York Air, Capital, World, etc. Some try to move to 
2nd tier (Air Florida) 
About 50-100 commuters (regional airlines with intermittent 
changes in name). Some :try to move to 3rd tier (Altai r, Empi ret 
Air Wisconsin) 
W 
I 
TI ERS 
1ST TIER 
(Super-
Markets) 
2ND TI ER 
(Large 
Neighborhood 
Stores) 
3RD TIER 
(Discount 
Houses and 
Boutiques) 
4TH TIER 
(Ma-and-
Pa Stores) 
Table 5.2 
SCENARIO B: 
SURVIVORS 
American 
Delta 
United 
Frontier 
Piedmont 
Southwest 
Same as Scenario A 
Same as Scenario A 
LABOR TURMOIL 
MERGERS 
Pan Am/TWA/Northwest 
US Air/Ozark 
DISBANDED/BROKE 
Bran iff 
Continental 
Eastern 
New York Air 
Republ ic 
Texas International 
Western 
~. 
I 
1ST TIER 
(Mega-Markets) 
2ND TIER 
3RD TIER 
(Sma 11 
Neighborhood 
Specialty 
Shops) 
4TH TI ER 
(Ma-and-
Pa Stores) 
Table 5.3 
SCENARIO C: ASSET PLAY 
SURV I VORS 
Ai r \n scons in 
Al ta i r 
Air Cal 
PSA 
MERGERS 
American/Southwest 
United/Frontier 
Delta/Piedmont 
PA/TWA/NW/US Air 
All Survivors merged 
into 1st tier 
DISBANDED/BROKE 
Braniff 
Continental 
Eas tern 
Republic 
Texas Internattonal 
Western 
Midway 
People Express 
Air Florida 
New York Air 
About 50-100 commuters providing feed to 1st Tier 
V1 
I 
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